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Foreword 
One of the questions raised by an eastwards enlargement of the 
European Union is how to extend the common agricultural 
policy. In the Central and East European Countries (CEECs), 
the importance of agriculture and the high proportion of income 
spent on food, suggest that subsidies and price support will 
have significant impact on both the sectoral - and the national 
- economies. 
Part I 
This report deals, in particular, with some likely economic 
consequences of applying the compensatory payments in the 
CEECs. The theoretical analysis was carried out within DG II, 
and complemented by case studies undertaken by external 
consultants. The report is published in order to contribute to the 
debate on a strategy for enlargement, but does not necessarily 
reflect the opinion of the Commission. 
Heinrich Matthes 
Chairman of the board of editors 
European Economy 
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Introduction 
The present paper deals with agricultural policy in relation to 
enlargement. It focuses on the compensatory payments that 
cereal and livestock farmers became entitled to following the 
decrease in institutional prices in the 1992 reform of the 
common agricultural policy (CAP). Some effects of granting 
such payments to the CEECs are investigated from a theoretical 
point of view and on the basis of case studies. Based on the 
findings, the social and economic motivation for extending 
compensatory payments to the CEECs is discussed. 
One or more of the associated countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEECs) may become members of the European Union 
within 5 to 15 years. Although the basic principle of 
enlargement is that new Member States should accept and 
adopt the entire acquis communautaire, experience from 
former rounds of enlargement has shown that the acquis in 
itself is affected by enlargement and that long transition periods 
have been necessary due to profound economic and 
institutional changes in the country concerned. For instance, to 
take account of the rural settlement policy of certain new 
Member States, the latest enlargement gave birth to a new 
objective for the Structural Funds. A long transition period for 
agricultural trade and price policies was used for the 
enlargement with Spain and Portugal. 
The questions related to eastward enlargement cannot be 
viewed as entirely separate from the institutional discussion 
that will be a main topic of the Intergovernmental Conference 
in 1996. One underlying issue is that the need for 
differentiation of certain policies may increase in the future. 
There are, in principle, two reasons for this. The first is that the 
range of political objectives will increase as more countries 
join. The second reason is that the Union will become still 
more heterogeneous. To apply common policies in unequal 
circumstances (economic, structural, social, etc.) may well 
produce different - not common - results. Differentiation 
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may therefore be a way to pursue a common goal in a wider 
Union. 
Differentiating policies is, however, not new in the Union's 
agricultural policy. The CAP is already subject to a certain 
degree of differentiation. Policy measures vary according to 
whether a farm is in the mountains or in the plains, in a high or 
low yield area, is large or small, is extensive or intensive, etc. 
Furthermore the so-called accompanying measures are 
elaborated and implemented on a local level with a high degree 
of differentiation with respect to the conditions for assistance. 
Thus to adapt and differentiate the CAP to meet the challenges 
set up by a forthcoming enlargement would not be a radical 
departure from current policy principles. 
As already stated, the present paper focuses on the implications 
of extending the compensatory payments to the CEECs. If the 
acquis communautaire principle is applied to agricultural policy 
and if the CAP does not undergo major changes, then farmers in 
new Member States would become entitled to the direct 
compensatory payments introduced by the 1992 CAP reform. 
The content of this paper is as follows. 
In section 1 the main policy elements in the CAP are discussed, 
with a focus on their economic and political relevance for 
enlargement. 
Section 2 addresses the economic implications of extending the 
compensatory payments. The analysis is based on economic 
theory, although factors especially relevant to the CEECs are 
stressed. 
Section 3 presents first a model analysis of the macroeconomic 
implications of payments in Poland. Then it reports on a case 
study of land and ownership structures in Poland and the Czech 
Republic and on some possible implications of the payments 
for income distribution, wealth, and land prices. 
Finally, the conclusions are presented in section 4. 
1. Agricultural policy principles and 
the compensatory payments 
1.1. Key features of the CAP 
Numerous revisions have contributed to make the CAP very 
complex. Reforms have been a response to budgetary crisis, 
changing objectives and concern for international trade. This 
has led to an increasing reliance on direct payments while price 
support is lower. However, three principles have continuously 
been stressed as central to the policy: unity of markets, 
Community preference, and financial solidarity. Unity of 
markets is pursued by removing trade barriers between 
Member States, harmonizing legislation and operating common 
intervention systems. Community preference is achieved 
principally by trade protection at external borders, and financial 
solidarity through the Community's participation in the costs of 
agricultural policy measures. 
To safeguard these principles and to pursue the agricultural 
policy objectives do not necessarily require all the measures 
currently used. To show this, it is useful to group measures 
according to how they intervene in markets. Due to the 
complexity of the common market organizations (CMO) such a 
grouping can only be approximate. A CMO is a balance 
between several policy measures. Five main groups are 
distinguished here and commented on from the perspective of 
EU enlargement. 
(i) Price support 
Nearly all CMOs include an element of market price guarantee 
and use institutional prices to guide application of market 
support measures. How support schemes are designed depends 
to a large extent on the nature of the product (storable, non-
storable, or transformable) and the nature of its market. 
Important intervention products are cereals, milk, beef, wine 
and olive oil. 
Price support measures have implications for the entire market 
- only border measures can limit their geographical coverage. 
If price support were to apply to only part of the enlarged 
Union or at a different level in new Member States, it would be 
necessary to restrict movements of agricultural products. If, at 
the same time, industrial products could move around freely, it 
would not only pose considerable administrative difficulties to 
exclude agricultural products, it might also substantially reduce 
the economic benefits of enlargement. 
(ii) Market support payments 
Direct payments are used to support markets in various ways 
and are related to (i) by their importance for providing price 
Part I 
support. They include subsidies to consumption, payments for 
temporary storage (privately operated intervention), premiums 
for cessation of production (wine, fruit), payments for 
withdrawal or non-harvest of produce, payments to stimulate 
processing or to change production varieties, slaughter 
premiums for young calves, etc. These payments should not be 
confused with direct income payments as the support they 
provide is mainly distributed through the markets or for 
undertaking market regulating measures. 
(iii) Compensatory payments 
Compensatory payments were created by the 1992 reform of 
the CAP. Contrary to market payments, they constitute an 
income transfer, not linked to output, although they are linked 
to the use of certain production factors. Arable payments are 
provided on a per hectare basis to arable farming and as a per 
head premium (suckler cows, male bovine animals, sheep, 
goats) to livestock farmers. 1 Compensatory payments transfer 
income directly to producers, but in return producers have to 
enrol in a set-aside scheme. For arable farming, these payments 
are based on the expected income effect of the reform' s price 
reduction. The payments also help to preserve a certain 
incentive balance between arable and livestock farming. 
Environmental concerns are also addressed with livestock 
payments; to receive maximum payments stocking rates must 
not exceed a certain level. The payments are not production-
neutral, due to the link between factor use and payments. Even 
though these links can be analysed, their effects on agricultural 
markets can be difficult to quantify. The size of the 
compensatory payments is determined by a hypothetical loss. 
This is reflected in how payments are differentiated. Farmers in 
low-yield regions are presumed to lose less from the decrease 
in intervention price and thus receive less compensation. This 
observation is important when considering the arguments for 
extending the compensatory payments to the CEECs. 
(iv) Supply control 
An inherent feature of many CMOs is supply control. This is 
needed to implement the price support objectives. Curbing 
supply can involve production quotas (milk) or restrictions on 
factor use (set-aside, extensification) or grubbing up perennial 
crops (wine, fruit). Short-term control can be achieved by 
withdrawal of surplus produce. The relation between supply 
control and the payments mentioned in (ii) and (iii) is strong. 
Payments in (ii) can provide the financial incentive to comply 
with supply control measures while those under (iii), have a 
more indirect economic relation to supply through the 
environmental conditions imposed. 
1 Livestock premiums also existed before the 1992 reform, but were adjusted in 
the reform package. 
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An inconvenient feature of supply control in relation to the 
CEECs is that it involves a good deal of administration and 
verification. If restrictions on factor use are imposed it is 
necessary to verify whether they are respected. Restrictions on 
output require control over movements of produce and some 
centralization of processing facilities. In the CEECs it would be 
necessary to establish new administrative procedures to ensure 
that support measures are not undermined by fraud. Fraud is 
already a persistent problem in the EU and incentives to illegal 
practice may be even larger in the CEECs, as the level of 
payments would be very significant compared with the general 
level of income. As long as even vital institutions in the CEECs 
are malfunctioning one may question the wisdom of burdening 
them with the complex administration necessary to run the 
present CAP. 
( v) Environment 
The accompanying measures of the 1992 reform enlarged the 
scope of already existing community initiatives. Apart from 
agri-environmental measures, programmes for afforestation and 
early retirement were strengthened. New options for 
environmental action reflect the increased awareness of 
agriculture's importance for the natural environment. They also 
signify a step towards a more targeted form of agricultural 
policy and they comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The 
task of elaborating and implementing the schemes is delegated 
to Member States though the European Commission has to 
approve them. 
1.2. Discussion and conclusion 
With reference to the groups defined above, the price support 
objective in (i) can be characterized as the driving force for the 
market measures in groups (ii) and (iv). A high level of price 
support will increase the need for supply control and other 
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forms of market regulation. A common level of prices is used 
to safeguard market unity, though it does not necessarily imply 
a specific level of price support. Community preference implies 
border measures and as such it is also an instrument of price 
support. Following the Uruguay Round Agreements, import 
protection changed from variable levies to fixed tariffs. This 
creates a stronger link between world market prices and EU 
market prices. However, the experience from the single market 
shows that it may be possible to achieve market unity and 
Community preference without price guarantees. Yet, if 
guaranteed price levels are maintained, they would have to 
apply to the whole of the Union's territory to avoid conflicts 
with single market rights. Intensity of the current measures 
could thus well be lower than today without compromising 
these principles. 
For arable farmers, payments are linked directly to the decrease 
in institutional prices. They are thus justified by an explicit 
reference to a historic and institutional situation, although the 
expected price decrease has remained hypothetical due to 
firmer prices on the world market. Their most important long-
term effect may be to support land prices. They do not in 
themselves play a role for Community preference or market 
unity, except that they help Community farmers to meet 
adjustment costs in a transition period. In Chapter 2 of this 
paper the economic features of the payments will be discussed 
in further detail. 
Environmental payments, afforestation and structural measures 
in agriculture are all targeted actions. Responsibility for the 
measures is delegated to a lower administrative level than the 
European Commission. They are, as a consequence, easier to 
differentiate according to local needs, ambitions and 
implementation constraints. The Commission's role is to 
monitor the economic effects of Member States' schemes and 
to ensure their compatibility with common objectives. 
2. Economic effects of the compensatory 
payments - a theoretical approach with 
special focus on the CEECs 
2.1. Introduction 
Payments based on the possession and cultivation of 
agricultural land will ceteris paribus increase land prices due to 
the supplementary rent that landowners receive. Higher land 
prices would have implications for the rate of structural 
adjustment and the market for credit. The influence on the 
distribution of income and wealth will obviously have social 
implications and the increased buying power of the 
beneficiaries may influence the economy as a whole. Some of 
these effects will be discussed in more detail below. 
Another important question is how payments would affect 
production of various crops. The financial support in question 
is not linked to quantity produced, but is conditional upon the 
quantity of factors possessed and on their use. A reward for 
specific production types will affect relative profitability of 
different crops considerably. This could be particularly 
distortive in future Member States, since the payments, as well 
as the CAP' s price hierarchy, reflect production and demand 
characteristics that are unlike those in the CEECs. A profound 
quantitative analysis of these questions would require much 
more insight into production and market conditions than is 
currently available. Therefore, only some tentative evaluations 
of this question can be provided. 
2.2. Resource use in agriculture and financial 
support: some basic observations 
It is widely recognized that financial support, as well as 
protectionist trade policies, have an influence on output 
production and factor use. The effects depend on the design and 
intensity of the policy measures. As a general rule, support 
measures have the strongest influence on the market for the 
input or output - to which the support payment is linked. In 
agriculture, it is common to distinguish between indirect 
(market price) support and direct support. Indirect transfer 
policies operate by supporting agricultural market prices or, 
less often, by subsidizing input prices. They tend to increase 
production volumes and input use. Direct transfer policies 
involve a transfer of funds directly from the public budget to 
the farmer. Contrary to market price support, they can be 
targeted towards specific groups and conditions can more easily 
be attached to them. Payments are seldom linked to production 
volumes, but to factors of production considered as fixed. To 
avoid stimulating marginal production volumes and to contain 
budgetary expenditure there is sometimes a payment ceiling per 
beneficiary. 
Part I 
The CAP' s compensatory payments to cereal farmers are 
linked to the area devoted to particular crops and are 
conditional on set-aside. Other payments are based on the 
number of certain animals and on stocking rates. However, 
neither type of compensation is decoupled; the first provides an 
additional rent for using land to produce the subsidized crop, 
while the second makes it more attractive to increase animal 
stock or the area devoted to fodder crops. Both kinds of 
payments are thus coupled to specific agricultural uses of land. 
They will increase land rent and thereby, ceteris paribus, 
increase the market price of land. This will not only be the case 
in Eastern Europe but also happens in the EU. However, in the 
EU, compensatory payments replace market price support, thus 
helping to stabilize land prices at a high level. The direct effect 
of capitalization could, as a consequence, be more difficult to 
observe, though it certainly exists. 
2.3. Compensatory payments and economic effects 
- theoretical evidence 
Compensatory payments affect agriculture and the general 
economy in a number of ways. They may: 
(i) increase farmers' (landowners') income and wealth; 
(ii) change the incentive structure in agricultural production; 
(iii) change conditions for structural adjustment; 
(iv) increase the value of land as collateral for credit and the 
demand for credit; 
(v) decrease the labour supply of agricultural households; 
(vi) influence the competitive position; 
(vii) introduce 'political' uncertainty about future income 
levels; 
(viii)increase beneficiaries' demand for services and goods; 
and 
(ix) affect economic conditions for other sectors and 
macroeconomic equilibria. 
These points are explored below. 
(i) Land owners' income and wealth 
According to Simons (1938) 1 'personal income may be defined 
as the sum of ( 1) the market values of rights exercised in 
1 Personal income taxation, Chicago, University of Chicago Press; 1938. 
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consumption and (2) the change in the store of property rights 
between the beginning and end of the period'. A farmer who 
owns his land and becomes entitled to compensatory payments 
will directly improve current consumption possibilities and to 
the extent that land prices increase, his store of property rights 
goes up. The regulations on compensatory payments do not 
impose any particular restrictions on how the subsidy should be 
spent so landowners are free to choose to increase current 
consumption, invest in non-agricultural activities, invest in land 
improvements or increase savings. Especially in the case of 
non-farming landowners, the payments may thus not benefit the 
rural economy. If, to become eligible for the payments, it is 
necessary to comply with binding restrictions this may reduce 
the profits from farming. The increase in personal income is 
thus not necessarily proportional to the payments. 
In some CEECs an important share of the land has been 
restored to non-farmers. This ownership structure could make it 
more difficult to find a political justification for the direct 
transfers. Even if the subsidy is paid to the person actually 
farming the land, the owner may indirectly become the real 
beneficiary, as the improved profits from the land allow 
increases of the rent charged. In the end, the payments may 
thus be of little benefit to the persons working on the land. This 
situation could lead to questioning the rationale of an 
agricultural policy that transfers wealth to a substantial number 
of non-farming landowners who benefited from restored land 
during the economic transition. 
(ii) Incentive structure 
The compensatory payments, as well as other CAP incentives, 
are conditional on certain types of production. Their relative 
importance aims to balance production incentives and demand 
structures in the present Union. However, this incentive 
structure is unlikely to match a market-efficient allocation of 
production resources in the CEECs. It is, in fact, difficult to 
have a clear vision of what an efficient structure is in the 
CEECs as long as the economies are in a transitory phase 
where demand and production patterns are changing rapidly. 
To introduce a - quite arbitrary - incentive structure that 
matches demand and production conditions in the actual (and 
historical) EU will almost certainly hamper market-efficient 
adjustment in the CEECs. The problem can be aggravated by 
the conditions attached to the compensatory payments. Set-
aside or extensification would tend to decrease the efficiency of 
production structures and reduce the profit from farming 
activities. This type of loss is a function of the entire structure 
of input and output prices and would tend to be endogenous. A 
major switch from, for example, growing non-subsidized 
potatoes to growing subsidized wheat may, for instance, raise 
prices for inputs specific to wheat production at the same time 
as wheat prices decline due to higher supply. 
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(iii) Structural development 
Studies on the situation in the CEECs have identified an 
inadequate farm structure as one impediment to the prosperity 
and development of the sector. While variations are big 
between countries, the farm structure is, at present, relatively 
polarized with predominance of very large - and very small 
- holdings and few intermediate types. Neither of the 
predominant types seems to be the most efficient in economic 
terms or, in the long term, viable as an independent economic 
unit. High land prices and compensatory payments could affect 
structural adjustment in various ways. 
Structural development could be stimulated by the 
compensatory payments if the general increase in land prices 
incites land holders to sell land and invest the money or 
themselves in other and more profitable industries. More land 
would then become available for restructuring, and while some 
farmers leave the sector, others may get better opportunities to 
develop. 
However, high asset prices are normally seen as an impediment 
to structural development in agriculture. Empirical evidence 
indicates that the number of farm sales decreases when prices 
are high. If the price increase is accompanied by higher price 
volatility it may further decrease turnover of the trade in farm 
land. 
Imperfections in the capital markets can accentuate negative 
effects on structural development. Potential farmers need to 
accumulate more funds to purchase land - thus the costs of 
entry to farming increase. This applies not only to would-be 
farmers, but also makes it more difficult for existing farmers to 
increase their holdings. This may be aggravated if government 
programmes for subsidized credit are exhausted too soon. It 
will change the risk profile of investments in agriculture as the 
farmer's income then depends not only on his managerial 
qualities, the growing and market conditions, but also on the 
long-term political risk of a non-continuation of the payments 
(see below). 
A related effect on structural adjustment is, in a wider sense, 
the increased costs of non-agricultural uses of land. Higher land 
prices make it less attractive to locate industries and other 
economic activities in rural regions and, as a consequence, rural 
development may slow down. If set-aside obligations are 
imposed together with the compensatory payments, as is 
currently the case, then economic activity in rural areas could 
suffer even more as output is reduced. Migration to urban 
centres may, for these reasons, increase. 
Structural adjustment and improvement of market efficiency 
are probably key factors in creating a viable agricultural sector 
in the CEECs. It would therefore be desirable to avoid counter-
productive policy measures. 
(iv) Credit 
Today, few loans to farmers in Eastern Europe are provided on 
a normal commercial basis. There are several reasons for this. 
First, agricultural profitability is often too low to allow 
profitable investments at market rates. Second, land is often not 
recognized as a collateral, for loan, partly due to the unclear 
situation with respect to property rights still prevailing. Third, 
even when recognized as a collateral, land prices are often 
artificially low, due to restrictions on trade. 
To relieve the first problem, an increased efficiency in 
production, processing and marketing is necessary. To solve 
the second and third problems, the establishment of credit 
institutions and real markets for land are needed. Progress in 
these areas is expected, and land prices would subsequently 
be expected to improve. Compensatory payments would make 
land even more expensive and thus further increase its value 
as a collateral for loans. This can put some landowners in a 
better position to obtain credits for restructuring the 
production apparatus. However, only existing landowners 
would really benefit from this. An increase in demand for 
credit from the agricultural sector would compete with credit 
demand from other sectors. Real interest rates may increase 
and the agricultural investment demand may crowd-out more 
productive investments in other non-subsidized sectors. 
However, at present, investment in agriculture seems to be 
below an efficient level, but this may become a problem at a 
later stage of development. A particular problem in a policy 
context is that a subsequent dismantling of support may 
involve huge risk for credit institutions. The value of land as a 
collateral would disappear if subsidy reduction leads to a 
steep decrease in land prices. Farmers and their credit 
institutions, therefore, have a common interest in avoiding 
this and will seek to reduce the political risks involved (see 
point (vii)). 
(v) Labour supply and direct income payments 
Compensatory payments are coupled to the use of specific 
production factors, and will thus affect production and resource 
allocation. However, even completely decoupled payments can 
influence production because of their influence on farm 
households' labour supply. Empirical investigations in 
developing countries and in Western Europe have confirmed 
that labour supply of farm households is reduced in response to 
decoupled payments. 1 
1 Kjeldahl R., Direct income payments to farmers, Report No 85, Danish 
Institute of Agricultural and Fisheries Economics. Valby (Copenhagen), 1995. 
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The link between labour response and production is strongest 
when labour markets are imperfect, when the age of farmers is 
high, and when, as a result, the approach to farming is more for 
'personal' profit than for 'commercial' profit. If such payments 
constitute an important fraction of household income, a rational 
utility maximizing choice for farm households would be to 
reduce labour time and increase leisure time. 
. In the context of East European enlargement, this disincentive 
effect may, in certain areas, reduce production volumes and 
variety and have unintended consequences for farm structure 
and the long-term prospects of rural development. Some farm 
households may prefer to concentrate on extensive but 
subsidized wheat or livestock production. This would permit 
them to decrease labour input to farming, collect a fixed income 
in the form of subsidies and still live reasonably well without 
strong incentives to provide work. The risky return from 
investing in the farm may be perceived as unattractive, as long 
as a nearly risk free (disregarding political risks) fixed return in 
the form of subsidies is available. 
On other farm types, such as the collectively owned and very 
big ones, the additional income may be spent according to a 
more businesslike strategy. This could involve repayment of 
public or private debt or investments in agricultural as well as 
non-agricultural sectors. Though the overall production 
response from the sector is indeterminate, agriculture would 
tend to become less labour intensive and more capital intensive 
as a result. 
The share of payments in income could become considerable. 
Take, for instance, the hypothetical example of a Lithuanian 
landowner with 20 hectares of land. Based on the typical local 
yield of only 2.5 t/ha the land could entitle him to payments of 
ECU 2 250, or four times the Lithuanian GDP/capita in 1994 
(of course this ratio may change if GDP improves before 
membership). 
(vi) Competitive position 
A central question related to all the aforementioned points is 
how the compensatory payments would affect the competitive 
position of farmers in the CEECs relative to EU farmers. In a 
long-term perspective, there is little doubt that payments and the 
conditions attached to them would hamper efficient resource use 
in CEEC agriculture as they do in the European Union. 
In the short and medium term, the payments may improve 
CEEC farmers' competitive position by relieving liquidity 
constraints that at present determine the level of (under) 
investment in the agricultural sector. This could bring about a 
faster modernization of agriculture and reduce production 
costs. However, competition problems in the sector today seem 
less linked to production costs in primary agriculture than to 
economically inefficient up (input suppliers) and downstream 
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(processing and marketing) industries. It may, therefore, be 
more desirable to favour investments in these sectors if the 
objective is to improve competitiveness. 
( vii) Policy risk 
A sector which becomes a client for public support is exposed 
to the risk of this support being withdrawn. As production 
structures adapt to the incentives provided by a specific support 
system, producers' income becomes more vulnerable to 
changes in the system. The sectoral response to this exposure 
has in most if not all EU countries, been to fight against 
changes in support levels by establishing strong organizations 
able to exert political influence. Hitherto, they have been rather 
successful and agricultural policy changes with negative 
implications for producers' income have, in general, been 
linked to some kind of compensation. The lobbying efforts are 
an efficiency loss seen from an overall economic perspective. 
Not only are these efforts quite costly in money terms - they 
also tie up precious human capital. 
Therefore, from a policy point of view, extending the 
compensatory payments to the CEECs would make it more 
difficult to reduce or abolish the payments as the CEEC 
farmers are likely to join ranks with their colleagues in the EU 
to preserve this important source of income and guarantee of 
wealth. 
(viii) Interaction with other sectors and local effects 
Economy-wide effects of farm subsidies are often estimated 
under the assumption of a single market for factors and goods 
where labour and other factors can move freely between 
industries. In such a framework the sum of economic welfare 
effects from subsidizing agriculture is always negative. But, as 
emphasized by empirical investigations, factor markets are 
segmented and labour is far from flexible. Segmentation of 
wages and markets, may provide an argument for agricultural 
policy if the subsidies benefit the local economy in a way that 
justifies the loss to the general economy. At the same time, a 
high degree of market segmentation may point to the need for 
infrastructural policies that could lower transaction costs for 
factors to move between markets, thereby contributing to 
overall efficiency. 
With respect to the direct compensatory payments, their effect 
on the rural economy and on other sectors will depend on bow 
they are financed and on how subsidies leak out. Leakage can 
be defined as the part of the subsidies that benefits non-farmers 
or is lost because of increased inefficiency. A part of the 
compensatory payments may leak out of the rural communities 
because it is captured by landowners in urban areas. This is a 
particular problem in Eastern Europe where land restitution 
based on historical property rights has created a class of urban 
landowners. 
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More leakage occurs, if the additional demand made possible 
by the compensatory payments, pushes up local prices for 
products, services and labour. Empirical investigations can be 
used to gain some insight into the economic linkages between 
households and the economic sectors. For instance, an inter-
regional urban-rural CGE model was used to investigate the 
effects of terminating certain US farm programmes.' It 
appeared that the household service sector situated in rural 
areas is highly dependent on the level of farm subsidies. 
Terminating coupled (production linked) farm subsidies led in 
the model to a contraction of the household service sector and 
the farm sector. This contraction is especially strong under the 
assumption that all production factors are owned locally. 
Under an assumption of more diversified factor ownership (for 
instance, that urban households own land) the economic 
incidence will be less marked in rural regions as consequences 
are distributed more widely among household groups. In both 
scenarios urban households gain considerably more from the 
liberalization than the rural households lose. 
However, if decoupled subsidies are terminated, the household 
service sector will suffer while farm output will be little 
affected. This is because the effect on resource use is lower 
with decoupled subsidies. Terminating decoupled subsidies 
would favour investment-goods producing sectors, because the 
decrease in farm subsidies would reduce the drain on available 
savings i.e. rural buying power would be reduced to the benefit 
of urban investors. 
An extrapolation of these model results to the CEECs would 
lead to the conclusion that the leakages of subsidies could be 
important in some countries: bad infrastructure would imply 
stronger market separation and landownership is diversified in 
the population. The effect on farmers' incomes may thus be 
reduced and the economic benefits rather arbitrarily distributed. 
(ix) Inflation and other macroeconomic variables 
Compensatory payments provide a cash injection for the 
economy. Although the point of injection is farmers, overall 
demand will be affected. The increase in buying power is 
potentially inflationary. In turn this may affect the exchange 
rate. Both effects are likely to influence the level of real 
incomes in the economy and contribute to a redistribution of 
wealth in favour of landowners. Inflation could, as a secondary 
effect, increase the demand for land and other assets 
traditionally considered as inflation safe, thus accentuating 
price increases. Additional macroeconomic aspects are 
1 Kilkenny M. 'Rural urban effects of terminating farm subsidies', American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics No 75, 1993. 
discussed below, where a model analysis of the Polish 
economy's estimated response to the CAP payments is 
reported. 
2.4. Summing up 
Compensatory payments would, ceteris paribus, lead to 
increasing land prices in all CEECs. The distribution of the 
wealth increase would depend on the ownership structure, as it 
is the landowner that in the long run gathers the benefits. A 
Part I 
substantial part of the transfers may for this and other reasons 
leak out of the sector. Higher land prices may in themselves 
hamper structural development. In the short run, compensatory 
payments could improve CEEC farmers' ability to compete by 
providing an economic safety net and relieving credit 
constraints. However, the current competitive difficulties of 
CEEC farmers are as much linked to inefficient up and 
downstream structures as to production costs. Introducing 
compensatory payments may make investment planning subject 
to additional policy risk, thus increasing lobbying incentives -
and costs - for the sector. Finally, the size of the payments 
may have macroeconomic implications through their effect on 
household demand. 
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3. Impact of extending the compensatory 
payments to new Member States -
empirical approach 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to case study analyses of the 
implications of extending direct payments to the CEECs. It 
draws on two reports produced for the Commission. The first 
study (Tabeau, 1996) is a CGE approach to estimate certain 
macroeconomic consequences that the compensatory payments 
would have for the Polish economy. The second study 
establishes evidence on some structural and economic variables 
likely to determine primary economic implications of such 
payments in the agricultural sectors of Poland and the Czech 
Republic (see Annex). 
Introducing compensatory payments in the CEECs will have 
direct implications for the EU budget. The budget impact 
primarily depends on which countries become members - and 
when - and on how payments are implemented. Transition 
periods may ease the immediate cost, but would not make a 
great difference in the long run, unless, in the meantime, the 
EU policy is reformed. Long-run costs are also a function of 
the yield and base area used to calculate payments. Though 
such figures are an empirical matter, they remain subject to 
negotiation. 
Assuming that the current CAP provisions are applied to the 
CEEC-10 the Commission has, in the agricultural strategy 
paper1 estimated the total costs of compensatory payments in 
year 2000 to be ECU 6.6 billion. This figure will not change 
significantly with time. The cost component most likely to 
1 Study on alternative stralegies for the development of relations in the field of agriculture 
between the EU and the associated countries wi1h a view to future accession of these 
countries. Communication by Mr. Fishier (DG VI). 1995. 
Table 1 
change is the cost of other market measures that will have a 
tendency to increase with production. Total budget costs are, 
under the same status quo assumption, estimated to increase 
from ECU 9 billion in 2000 to 12.2 billion in 2010. However, 
small changes in the assumptions are likely to change results 
significantly. Especially crucial is the assumption on increases 
in productivity as the costs of the price policy are high for 
marginal production increases. 
Table 1 provides the working hypothesis of the amount of these 
payments necessary in the two case-study countries and in 
CEEC-10. These estimates are based on the projections in 
DG VI country studies and may vary from other sources. 
The following section provides a summary of the model 
analysis concerned with the macroeconomic consequences of 
making compensatory payments to farmers in Poland. Then 
section 3.3 discusses the implications that sectoral 
characteristics in Poland and the Czech Republic may have for 
the effects of these payments. 
3.2. Direct transfer to Polish farmers -
certain macroeconomic implications 
The investigation reported here focuses especially on the 
impact of compensatory payments and agricultural prices. It is 
carried out by a CGE model of the Polish economy calibrated 
on 1993 data. 2 The model is sequentially dynamic and 
generates results for each year in the period 1995 to 2004. It 
should be noted, that CGE models are best at investigating 
long-term real effects in the economy and less useful in 
analysing purely monetary phenomena and short-term 
instability. Because they rely on market clearing through price 
2 The model was developed under an ACE project - see Report No 92-0745-F. 
Budgetary estimates based on production structures and volumes projected to 2000 
Poland 
Czech Republic 
CEEC-10 
Source: European Commission, DG VL 
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Arable crops 
1 844 
565 
5 789 
Beef premium 
345 
54 
808 
Total compensatory 
payments 
2 189 
619 
6 597 
(million EC/J) 
Total expenditures 
including market measures 
3 178 
902 
8 958 
adjustments, CGE models are often called neoclassical. The 
current model provides results in real terms, though prices are 
stated in relative terms. 
The model disaggregates the economy into three type of 
households (urban, farmer, and pensioner), four production 
factors (capital, paid labour, farmers, and land) and four sectors 
(agriculture, manufacturing, market services, non-market 
services). For a further description and detailed results see 
Tabeau, 1996. 1 
3.2.1. The scenarios 
Policy options are described by scenarios. To illustrate the 
effect of accession, higher agricultural prices and compensatory 
payments, three EU scenarios were formulated. They are all 
based on the assumption that Poland will become a member of 
the EU in 2000, which may be earlier than normally expected. 
Accession is expressed as an 80% decrease of Polish import 
taxes on non-agricultural products. For agricultural products all 
1 
'Direct payments to Polish farmers - a CGE approach' (available from 
DG U, European Commission). 
Table 2 
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import taxes are removed, but prices are aligned to the EU 
level. In the first EU scenario (EUA-) it is assumed that the EU 
has liberalized its agricultural policy, thus agricultural prices in 
Poland become equal to world market prices on accession. The 
second EU scenario (EUA+) represents the situation where EU 
prices remain high, by assuming that agricultural prices 
increase by 10% in ecu terms. A third EU scenario (EUA+CP) 
adds compensatory payments to the assumptions in EUA+. All 
scenarios are compared to a baseline non-EU scenario - a 
1993 policy status quo - with border protection and other 
policy variables unchanged. 
Scenarios EUA-and EUA+ 
The EUA- scenario shows that Poland's GDP will increase 
significantly compared with the non-EU scenario. This is due to 
economic benefits of increased trade and lower domestic prices 
(lower border taxes). Five-year cumulated GDP growth 
amounts to 36.1 % which is higher than the non-EU scenario 
growth of 27.4%. Also, total investments increase especially 
because of increased profitability in the manufacturing sector. 
However, as available savings limit the amount of total 
investments, this is somewhat to the detriment of agriculture 
where the stock of capital decreases slightly. However, even 
investments in the manufacturing sector would benefit farmers 
Impacts on the Polish economy of EU accession: three scenarios for the CAP 
Period Non-EU Before EUA- EUA+ EUA+CP 
accession iwi1thout (with linciludiI11g 
agri-price agri-price compensauory 
increase) iDcrease) pa)'llllmlllP 
GDP growth(%)' 
1995-99 28.7 
2000-04 27.4 36.1 25.4 Zl.O 
Household income l ]/. l! 
(million ECU) 
Farmer 2004 6600 -180 +1300 +3460 
Urban 2004 80200 + 10100 + 1440 +2550 
Pensioner 2004 19 350 +270 +2UII +250 
Capital growth (%) 1 
Total 1994-99 36.1 
2000-04 32.5 35.n 2$ .. D ]«))_(O 
Agriculture 1994-99 34.2 
2000-04 26.1 -2.2 55.(JJ 5t!ll.4 
Manufacturing 1994-99 33.9 
2000-04 30.2 41.2 n~u ll.71 
1 Cumulated over five years. 
1 Income difference compared with non-EU. 
So11rre: Tabeau, 1996. 
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to the extent that efficiency in agricultural up and downstream 
industries is improved. Income of urban households increases 
strongly under this scenario, while farmers, compared with the 
non-EU scenario, lose because of a lower level of investments 
in the farm sector. 
However, the situation changes significantly if agricultural 
prices do increase as assumed in EUA+. Not only does this 
scenario result in lower GDP growth rates than the EUA-; GDP 
growth even falls slightly below the non-EU scenario. The 
reason is that the share of overall income spent on food 
products is high in Poland. Substantial food price increases 
could, therefore, depress real income and this will then reduce 
the more income-elastic demand for non-agricultural products. 
The result is that the urban households will lose ECU 8 660 
million of their accession gain ( down to ECU 1 440 million) 
while farmers' households will end up gaining ECU 1 300 
million compared with the non-EU scenario. However, even if 
GDP is slightly lower than in the non-EU scenario, real 
household incomes are maintained or even improved due to the 
decrease in overall price levels that results from lower import 
taxes. As an obvious response to higher agricultural product 
prices, agricultural investments and output increase, but this 
happens at the expense of other investment projects. The total 
capital stock over the five-year period only increases 28.1 % 
instead of the 35.1 % estimated for EUA-. 
This model includes an assumption of exogenous government 
spending, which may be unrealistic if GDP growth slows so 
much that the budget deficit increases. The Polish government 
may, in that case, choose to reduce public expenditure and this 
would have a negative effect on growth rates. If so, the 
slowdown of GDP growth in EUA+ may be accentuated. On 
the other hand, this - as any - model is a crude simplification 
of reality. The results produced for the EU scenarios 
emphasize, in particular, the trade effects of EU accession and 
the negative economic effect of higher agricultural prices in an 
economy where consumers spend a significant fraction of their 
income on food. It will almost certainly underestimate the 
positive effects of membership as it does not take account of, 
for instance, increased foreign investments in Poland, more 
assistance for structural development, or other complex 
consequences of membership. Though it is preferable that the 
base scenario matches economic reality, this is not essential in 
this exercise where the base is used mainly to analyse changes 
in a few policy parameters. 
Scenario EUA+CP 
EUA+CP investigates the effect of a hypothetical direct - and 
decoupled - transfer from the EU budget to Polish farm 
households every year in the period 2000 to 2004. Assuming 
that actual CAP legislation is applied to Polish production as 
forecast for 2000, the Commission estimated that compensatory 
payments would amount to ECU 2 189 million. This is close to 
3% of Poland's GDP in 1993 and even if the economy expands 
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relatively fast the transfer will still exceed 2% of GDP in 2000. 
In the agricultural sector payments would equal 47% of the 
value of the gross agricultural output generated by Polish 
farmers in 1993. 1 Even in 2000, this would constitute a major 
part of agricultural income. 
An important economic implication of transferring this subsidy 
to farmers is to increase annual GDP growth (compared with 
EUA+) because payments, in the first instance, stimulate farm 
households' demand for goods and services from other sectors. 
The transfer corresponds to an expansionary fiscal policy with 
the particular feature that the expansion is a 'gift' from the 
outside. To satisfy additional demand, exports decrease slightly 
and imports increase. 
However, when taking into account the fact that the payments, 
cumulated over five years, amount to 10 to 15% of one year's 
GDP, the 1.6% improvement in GDP over the same five-year 
period seems small (27 instead of 25.4% ). 
With respect to income distribution, farmers become, as one 
would expect, better off as their real income now increases by 
ECU 3 460 million compared with non-EU. This is ECU 2 160 
million added to the income improvement that farmers got in 
the EUA+ only because of the higher agricultural prices. Urban 
households also benefit from the increased demand from the 
agricultural sector and their real income would in 2004 be ECU 
1 110 million higher. The relative importance of these gains 
could be appreciated by comparing with the reference income 
stated in the non-EU scenario column. 
Pensioners gain slightly in all scenarios. This is due to 
increases in the income they derive from other sources (e.g. 
farming or capital rents). 
The model probably understates the negative effects of the 
compensatory payments on the economy. For technical reasons 
the income transfer was considered to be decoupled. This 
means that no account has been taken of the costs due to the 
less efficient use of resources that arise from the factor link of 
the subsidies. Nor has the loss to the general economy caused 
by set-aside been taken into account. The size of such losses is 
difficult to estimate with the current model, but will depend on 
the distribution of land within farms and on the particular 
combination of input and output prices. Any increase in 
agricultural investment due to factor linked subsidies would 
leave fewer capital resources available for other sectors. 
According to the detailed results reported in Tabeau (1996) 
agricultural income will, in the EUA+CP scenario, decrease 
relative to other incomes. The reason is that investments 
generated by the extra household demand are directed mostly 
towards non-agricultural products. In consequence, the capital 
stock in agriculture is renewed at a slower rate and, in the long 
1 Source: 'Country Report on Poland', DG VI, 1995. 
run, less income will be generated from production. Although, 
in the model, this is interpreted as an income decrease, it would 
probably be realistic to expect an increased out-flow of labour 
from agriculture to other sectors (push-pull effects). The 
compensatory payments may thus increase household income, 
but decrease income derived from labour. In the end, this 
would affect those who in the future would like to buy into 
farming as they will have to pay the capitalized value of the 
income support while, at the same time, suffering from a lower 
return to labour. As the most mobile part of the labour force is 
the young and best educated, the compensatory payments may 
slow mobility and hamper structural development opportunities 
for existing landowners, but increase incentives for the young 
and more dynamic sections of the rural population to migrate 
towards the non-agricultural sector. Both phenomena would, in 
the long run, decrease productivity of the agricultural sector. 
The demand boost due to compensatory payments and the 
increase in agricultural prices are both inflationary and would 
cause the trade balance to deteriorate. This could have a 
negative affect on the exchange rate and lower real income 
levels for other groups in society. On the other hand, direct 
transfers will support the exchange rate. However, the present 
approach is not well suited to describe implications for nominal 
variables and no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
3.2.2. Conclusion 
Though Poland must be expected to benefit from EU 
membership, the gain is substantially diminished if agricultural 
prices are increased upon accession. This is explained by the 
large share of Polish incomes spent on food. Even though 
Polish farmers would gain from a price increase, the loss 
imposed on non-farmers exceeds this gain considerably. 
If, in addition to the price increases, compensatory payments 
worth ECU 2 189 million are transferred to Polish farm 
households this will accentuate farmers' gains but only have a 
small positive effect on Poland's GDP. The estimated GDP 
effect can be described as a one-off increase, while long-term 
growth rates do not change markedly. As the possible negative 
effect on resource allocation has not been taken into account, 
even this small positive GDP effect may be overstated. This 
points to the incapacity of direct income transfers to promote 
economic catching up with the EU. If, alternatively, such funds 
were used to finance projects aiming at improving economic 
structures, then a similar demand-driven expansion may take 
place, but, contrary to using compensatory payments, prospects 
for long-term growth would be improved too. 
3.3. Distribution of income and wealth- a case 
study of the Czech Republic and Poland 
Good social or economic reasons would be necessary to justify 
distribution of ECU 6.6 billion as cash payments. This section 
Part I 
takes a closer look at some of the effects that the compensatory 
payments could have for income and wealth in Poland and the 
Czech Republic. The analysis is partly based on the 
background information and discussion provided in a separate 
report (CEAS 1995) and partly on evidence from other studies. 
The Czech Republic is a typical example of how land use 
patterns were altered under Communism. Ownership rights 
were abolished and the small farms were swallowed by large 
cooperatives. The recent restitution of land ownership rights 
has therefore led to a very apparent difference between 
ownership and farming structures. Agriculture is less important 
in the Czech economy than in most other CEECs. In 1994 it 
contributed 3% to GDP. 
A specific feature of Poland in the present context is that most 
land remained in private use during Communism. There are 
thus fewer problems related to land distribution than in many 
other of the former command economies. However, as in most 
other CEECs, the farm structure is polarized, and the economic 
importance of the sector is high. Agriculture contributes 6.3% 
to GDP (1994). Poland occupies a third of CEEC-10 
agricultural area. 
In the following, some general features and their relation to 
compensatory payments are discussed. To simplify the analysis 
only the arable area payments have been investigated. As this, 
in value terms, constitutes about 80 to 90% of the payments 
( see Table 1) and as the beef premium is also area linked, this 
simplification is not expected to change the conclusions 
significantly. 
3.3.1. Czech Republic 
Since transition began in 1989, gross agricultural output has 
decreased by about 28%. This dramatic change is a result of 
low agricultural profitability, the land restitution process and 
structural and institutional factors. In 1989, only 3% of total 
agricultural land was owned and farmed by individuals. The 
remaining share was either owned by the State (36%) or by 
collectives (61 %). These units had average sizes of 2 500 and 
6 OOO ha, respectively. 
The Czech land reforms aim to re-establish private ownership 
with minimum disruption to the structure of holdings. 
Restitution of land has, therefore, not led to a large scale break-
up of production units. Only about one fifth of agricultural land 
is now cultivated in holdings below 30 ha (see Table 9). While 
roughly 1 million ha are operated by family farms of an average 
size of 16 ha, more than 3 million ha are still cultivated in some 
form of cooperative or partnership structure of an average size 
around 1 200 ha. The holding structure has thus little 
resemblance to the family farm structure common in the EU. 
This structural characteristic is not expected to change in the 
coming years. Though the average farm size may still decrease 
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this does not necessarily signify a real structural change, but 
rather that small parts of some large holdings are taken over by 
the legal owner. Most of the area remains farmed within large 
units, however. 
A consequence of the restitution of ownership rights and 
limited structural change is that 87% of farming activities take 
place on rented land. While there are an estimated 3.5 million 
landowners in the Czech Republic only around 1.4 million 
belong to the rural population. The remaining 2.1 million 
landowners (60%) are located in urban settlements. Urban land-
owners hold about 40% of the land restored until now .1 
The land market is characterized by administratively determined 
prices and rents. There is, however, little transparency and it is 
difficult to assess whether the quoted prices reflect the value of 
land appropriately. According to the information that could be 
obtained, the average land price for 1994 was close to ECU 
1 500/ha, though some well-situated plots are traded at a price 
two to three times higher. Land rents are slightly above 1 % of 
this price. They are, even in relative terms, thus much lower 
than in Western Europe. This corresponds well, however, with 
the fact that profits from farming are currently depressed or 
negative. Land prices, on the contrary, do not necessarily reflect 
temporarily low profits, but may include an anticipated future 
improvement in the return to land or, in some cases, the value of 
non-agricultural uses of the land. 
Agricultural profitability is very low in the Czech Republic. 
According to some calculations the return to land is even 
negative. In 1994, the net value added in agriculture amounted 
to Kcs 21.4 billion (or ECU 625 million). When wages and 
capital expenses are deducted this turns into a negative return 
to land of Kcs 6.7 billion. This may, however, reflect the fact 
that the imputed costs of capital are too high thus exaggerating 
the negative return to land. 
During transition, the cropping pattern in the Czech Republic 
moved towards more cereals and oilseeds, at the expense of 
potatoes and sugar beet. This is partly due to lower demand for 
potatoes as livestock feed and a government programme 
stimulating use of biofuels. 
3.3.2. Implications of compensatory payments 
in the Czech Republic 
If compensatory payments are introduced in the Czech 
Republic, the structural conditions summarized above will 
determine the distribution effects of the payments. 
A possible scenario is the following. The payments will be paid 
to those who exploit the land, but according to 1994 figures 
1 The definition of urban/rural in this context is not known. 
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only 12% of the land is exploited directly by the owners. Most 
payments will in reality accrue to large private cooperatives, 
who, in principle, are free to dispose of the money as they like. 
According to the estimate summarized in Table 3, this will 
increase gross revenue from cereals by more than 60%. Profits 
will increase relatively more, as costs will not increase a lot, 
though some additional expenses may arise due to more 
administration and restrictions on production (set-aside, 
environmental cross compliance). 
Table 3 
Potential impact of compensatory payments on typical 
Czech cereal farms' gross revenues 
Average cereal yield (tonnes/ha) 1 
Compensatory payments per reference tonnes 
Compensatory payments per hectare 
Set-aside payments per hectare 
Average revenue received from area payments 
• in small farms scheme 
• in professional scheme 
Revenue from crop (cereals) sales2 
Total revenue per hectare 
• in small farms scheme 
• in professional scheme 
% increase in revenue as a result of area payments 
• small farmer 
• professional farmer 
1 Cereal yields chosen. 
Cereal revenues based on ECU 88/tonne. 
' If not otherwise indicated, figures are in ecu. 
Year 2000 
(projected)' 
4.49 
54.3 
244.0 
309 
244 
250.5 
395 
639 
646 
61.7 
63.4 
However, those who farm on tenanted land, thus, most 
cooperatives, may not, in the long run, profit from the increase 
in payments. The legal owners of the land may try to charge 
higher rents and in this way benefit from the payments. The 
extent to which they will be able to increase rents depends on 
the local market conditions, negotiating power, legislation and 
the provisions in rental contracts. If landowners could exercise 
their ownership right freely, they would be able to recuperate 
most of the payments (net of extra costs imposed by enrolling 
in the scheme) and the value of land would rise 
correspondingly. 
With respect to distribution, a key characteristic is that a large 
proportion of the landowners reside in urban areas. According 
to the estimate already mentioned, they own around 40% of 
restored land or around 1.4 million ha of the total arable area of 
4.2 million ha. If urban households capture the increase in land 
rent due to compensatory payments this will increase the 
annual income of urban households by some ECU 206 million. 
The wealth increase for urban households due to higher land 
prices could be estimated to be ECU 4 to 6 billion assuming 
real interest rates of 3 to 5%. As the information on the actual 
distribution of land is incomplete, these figures are very crude 
estimates and only serve to provide an idea of the orders of 
magnitude involved. 
3.3.3. Poland 
The decrease in agricultural production has been less dramatic 
in Poland than in other CEECs. Important reasons are that 
Communism inflicted only a moderate change in ownership 
structure, and that Poland has operated a more protectionist 
agricultural policy than other CEECs. Prior to transition ( 1989), 
72.1 % of the land was in the hand of private farmers. This 
share has since, because of land restitution, increased to 91 % 
( 1994 ), the vast majority of which is farmed by the owners. For 
the remaining land, renting plays an increasingly important role 
for improving the structure of holdings. Polarization of farm 
structure in Poland is essentially a geographical phenomenon. 
The biggest farms are the former State holdings concentrated in 
the north and north-west regions. In other parts of the country, 
the average size of holdings remains low, but while the number 
of very small farms ( < 2 ha) is unchanged, bigger plots are 
concentrated especially by renting land. The fairly unchanged 
ownership structure and the high rate of unemployment in rural 
areas have hindered the large transition-induced decrease in the 
agricultural labour force often seen in other CEECs. Since 1989 
it has declined only 15%, which is a rate comparable to the 
development in the EU. The rural outmigration is expected to 
remain low in the medium term. 
The land market in Poland seems to be more free than in the 
Czech Republic, though prices are at half the Czech level 
(measured in ecu). On average, land is traded at ECU 706 
(Zl 1900) per hectare ( 1994 ). The difference in price level 
between the two countries may reflect quality differences, but 
also that lack of capital and constraints on credit are 
especially pronounced in Poland. There is a wide spread in 
land rents which are, in general, linked to agricultural 
commodity prices as they are set in kind. Rents range from 
ECU Oto 110 per hectare. At the low end of the market, the 
tenant simply assumes the land tax obligation and pays no 
rent to the owner. 
It has not been possible to obtain reliable figures for the return 
to land in Poland. However, farmers' household income is on 
average 87% of the national average. But, as most farm 
households (80%) have multiple income sources, this does not 
say much about profits from farming. 
3.3.4. Implications of compensatory payments 
in Poland 
Contrary to the Czech Republic (and other CEECs with a 
similar structure), the majority of Poland's farm households 
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will directly experience the wealth and the income effects from 
the payments as land is mostly owner occupied. However, 
estimated payment rates are somewhat lower than in the Czech 
Republic due to lower cereal yields. The estimated impact on 
gross revenue is repeated in Table 4. As in the Czech Republic, 
the payments would constitute the major part of the profit from 
the land, and also here land values would be expected to 
increase. However, lower payment rates in Poland will 
moderate the increase of land price in absolute terms. In 
relative terms, however, the increase may be greater. 
Table 4 
Potential impact of compensatory payments on typical 
Polish cereal farms' gross revenues 
Average cereal yield! 
Compensatory payments per reference tonne 
Compensatory payments per hectare 
Set-aside payments per hectare 
Average revenue received from area payments2 
• in small farms scheme 
• in professional scheme 
Revenue from crop (cereals) sales4 
Total revenue per hectare 
• in small farms scheme 
• in professional scheme 
% increase in revenue as a result of area payments 
• in small farms scheme 
• in professional scheme 
1 If not otherwise indicated, figures are in ecu. 
Year 2000 
(projected)' 
3.28 
54.3 
178 
226 
178 
183 
321 
500 
504 
55.4 
56.9 
Cereal yields chosen as they are higher than oilseed and pulse yields. 
·' Set-aside assumed rate of 10%. 
' Cereal price based on ECU 98/tonne ( 1994 average Polish price). 
Cropping patterns could become affected. Potatoes are a very 
popular crop in Poland and widely used as animal feed -
especially for pigs. Although it is expected that the importance 
of potatoes will decrease in the future, projections in the 
Commission's country reports reach the result that there will 
still be more than 10% of agricultural land under this crop in 
2000. However, potatoes are not currently the object of direct 
intervention under the CAP. It is therefore likely that potato 
cultivation for feed purposes will decrease steeply if 
compensatory payments are made available to cereal growers. 
Crops eligible for CAP subsidies could substitute for potatoes 
as a feed component. It is not clear what economic and 
environmental implications such a shift would have, but this 
deserves investigation as the problem is not unique to Poland 
and may have implications for the EU budgetary costs of 
enlargement. 
15 
The CAP and enlargement economic effects of the compensatory payments 
4. Conclusions 
The objective of the present study has been to look into the 
effects to be expected from extending the CAP compensatory 
payments to farmers in the CEECs. Agricultural policy analysts 
have previously questioned the rationale of doing so. Also in 
the Commission's agricultural strategy paper it was emphasized 
that there are no economic reasons to provide these payments 
as farmers in the CEECs would not experience any price cuts 
upon entry. In the present study, this view is supported by the 
analysis. In fact, it seems that there may be several good 
reasons not to extend these payments to the CEECs. 
First, these payments, on their own, are not an essential element 
in safeguarding the principles of the CAP. Further, they are, 
from the outset, differentiated according to the loss in sales 
revenue expected because of the 1992 reform of the CAP. 
Based on this simple observation it would be uncontroversial to 
argue that CEECs' farmers should not be entitled to a payment 
as they will suffer no losses because of EU membership. This 
could justify why the CEECs should have accession conditions 
which differ from those offered to the latest entrants. 
Second, though the cash value of the transfer may give an 
initial economic boost to certain rural areas, the payments will 
be expected to increase the price of agricultural land and may 
thus hamper structural development of farms and rural 
development as a whole. 
Third, macroeconomic modelling showed that farmers in the 
case study country, Poland, are already made better off relative 
to other citizens following EU accession (high price scenario), 
thus contradicting any redistributive argument for extending the 
payments. Effects of the payments in the economy would be 
similar to an expansionary fiscal policy, but benefit farmers 
mainly. Yet, as with expansionary fiscal policy, the long-term 
macroeconomic benefits are likely to be weak and the increase 
in demand may worsen any inflationary effect of the 
simultaneous food price increases. The macro model also 
illustrated the negative effect on the Polish economy of 
substantial increases in food prices. 
Fourth, distribution of the payments may - seen from the 
Community taxpayer's viewpoint- be quite arbitrary. Even if 
payments are granted to the land users, they may in the end 
benefit landowners mainly. In the Czech Republic and other 
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CEECs, a major proportion of the land is owned by urban 
dwellers. It could be asked why a large fraction of CAP 
subsidies should benefit those in the urban population that for 
historical reasons have regained the right to their land. 
Fifth, not only the ownership structure, but also the 
organization of the holdings is radically different in the EU and 
most CEECs. In the Czech Republic, only a small proportion of 
the land is cultivated in units comparable to the EU concept of 
a family farm. Most farm production takes place in large 
cooperatives of several thousand hectares and profits are shared 
between owners and workers in various ways. The transfers to 
such big 'industrial farm units' will be considerable and with 
unknown implications for rural income and rural development. 
Sixth, even if the payments may have certain positive effects on 
the agriculture sector it should be investigated whether greater 
benefits could not be obtained more efficiently with targeted 
instruments. Structural measures seem more appropriate to 
create the conditions for improving the economy in a 
sustainable fashion and to shorten the time it will take for the 
economy to catch up with the EU. 
This study has pointed to potential economic problems of 
extending the compensatory payments to the CEECs. However, 
the questions deserve further treatment and the main 
contribution of the present analysis may be to serve as a 
starting point for renewed investigation and reflection. Many 
theoretical concerns are not only relevant for compensatory 
payments in the CEECs, but could also be raised in relation to 
other similar instruments. Some would also apply to the CAP in 
the EU. Fundamental differences between the farm sector in the 
EU and in the CEECs create, however, a particular need for a 
closer examination of the economic structures before actual 
policy measures are extended. 
The economic arguments leave, however, a political counter-
argument unanswered. Would it be possible to defend a policy 
which transfers important cash subsidies to farmers in the rich 
EU countries, but not to farmers in the poorer CEECs? To 
solve this problem, reflection on the future of the CAP would 
be necessary. It may imply redefining the role of direct 
payments. This should be done with an objective to make sure 
that measures more appropriately target the political objectives 
which motivate the common agricultural policy. 
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Agriculture in the Czech Republic and Poland 
Land, labour and income 
by CEAS Consultants1 
1 CEAS Consultants (Wye) Ltd, Centre for European Agricultural Studies. 
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Special glossary/abbreviations used in Annex 
AAPS Arable Area Payments Scheme 
APA Agricultural Property Agency (Poland) 
CEECs 
CAP 
CPI 
cso 
GAO 
GAP 
GUS 
TUAA 
VUZE 
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Central and East European Countries 
common agricultural policy 
consumer price index 
Czech Statistical Office 
gross agricultural output 
gross agricultural product 
Gl6wny Urzad Statystyczny (Polish Statistical Office) 
total utilizable agricultural area 
Agricultural Economics Research Institute: Czech Republic 
1. Introduction 
As part of their research programme, DG II has undertaken a 
study which seeks to improve the understanding of some of the 
consequences of introducing direct payments into the CEECs. 
CEAS Consultants were commissioned to assist the DG II 
research through the provision of supporting and background 
information for two case study countries: the Czech Republic 
and Poland. 
1.1. Objectives 
The objective of the work carried out by CEAS Consultants 
and addressed in this report was to provide information for 
each case study country in the following areas: 
(i) the position of agriculture within the economy; 
(ii) the structure of holdings and production; 
(iii) the market for agricultural land covering current 
ownership pattern, definition of ownership, land prices 
and rental values (including developments since transition 
and the potential direction of change in the next five years, 
institutional factors, rules and regulations affecting the 
market); 
(iv) the market for labour including the use of labour on farms, 
the general rural labour market, rural-urban migration, the 
direction of change in the next five years; 
(v) household income including income sources and part-time 
farming, income in kind and the direction of change in the 
next five years; 
(vi) an assessment of the direction of influence of direct 
payments on cropping patterns. 
Table 5 
Important economic indicators in the Czech economy, 1990-95 
1990 1991 
% change GDP -1.2 -14.2 
% change consumer prices + 9.6 + 56.7 
% unemployed 0.8 4.1 
Exchange rate Kcs/ECU 22.9 36.5 
Note: (e) = estimate. 
Source: CSO, VUZE, DG VI, European Commission. 
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1.2. Methodology and report structure 
The study has been undertaken by desk research and 
discussions with some observers (e.g. academics, researchers) 
in each of the case study countries. 
The report structure is as follows: 
section 1 (this section): introduction 
section 2: the Czech Republic: covering all issues referred to in 
1.1. for the position of agriculture, the land and labour markets, 
ownership and income 
section 3: Poland: as Czech Republic 
section 4: overview of the direction of impact of direct 
payments on cropping patterns, the future direction of the land 
and labour markets and agricultural income in each country. 
2. Czech Republic 
2.1. The position of agriculture in the Czech 
economy 
Czech agriculture, like the whole Czech economy, has 
experienced substantial change since the transition from a 
centrally planned to a more market-oriented economy began in 
1989. The economic policy during transition has been based 
largely on restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, market 
liberalization and privatization. The Czech currency was 
devalued from Kcs 5.39 to the US dollar to Kcs 28 to the dollar 
in 1990 (roughly ECU 1 = Kcs 3 to ECU 1 = Kcs 23). About 
85% of all producer and consumer prices were removed from 
State controls in 1991 and a rapid programme of privatization 
of State assets was initiated. 
1992 1993 1994 1995 (e) 
-6.4 -0.9 +2.6 +4.2 
+ 11.1 + 20.8 + 10.0 + 9.0 
2.6 3.5 3.2 4.0 
36.6 34.1 34.1 36.3 
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The impact of the earl y years of transition and economic 
reform resulted in significant decreases in the level of GDP 
( 1990-93 ), rapid increases in price inflation and a small 
increase in the level of unemployment (Table 5). 
By l 994 , however, the Czech economy had moved from 
decline into recovery, with GDP increasing by 2.6 % and 
expected to grow by a further 4.2% in 1995. 
Against this background, gross agricultural output has 
decreased by about 28 % since 1989 (Table 6) and the share of 
GDP accounted for by agriculture has decreased from an 
estimated 6% in 1990 to 3% in 1994. Since farm-gate prices 
were subject to some government controls , prices in the sector 
did not rise as much as in other sectors resulting in the gross 
value added in the sector decreasing by more than gross 
agricultural output. 
Although the process of decline in the agricultural sector 
appears to have slowed down in 1993/94, forecasts by VUZE 
expect the sector to continue to decline in relative importance 
with the forecast agricultural share of GDP in 2000 estimated 
to be 2.5%. 
Table 6 
Gross agricultural output, 1989-94 (indices) 
Source: CSO. 
Table 7 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
100.0 
97 .7 
89.0 
78 .3 
76.4 
72.2 
Economic account for agriculture, 1992-94 (extracts) 
Gross agricultural output 
Intermediate consumption 
Gross value added at market prices 
Depreciation 
Net value added at market prices 
1992 
96.9 
70.1 
26.8 
8.3 
18.5 
Although gross value added in agriculture has increased from 
26.8% in 1992 to 30.6% in 1994 (Table 7), this remains low by 
comparison with EU countries. 
2.2. Agricultural production 
Of the total agricultural area of 4.28 million ha in 1995 , about 
three quarters is arable land, about 20% permanent grassland, 
and the balance is accounted for by permanent crops (Graph 1). 
2.2.1. Crop production 
Arable land accounts for about 75 % of the total agricultural 
area in the Czech Republic (Graph 2). In 1994, this amounted 
to 3 158 million ha, a total area that has not altered 
significantly since 1989 (since 1989, the arable area has 
decreased by 2.3%: see also Appendix 2). 
Some 55% of the arable land was planted with cereals in 1994 
(mostly wheat and barley), with fodder crops (mainly maize 
silage), oilseeds, sugar beet and potatoes accounting for 29, 8, 
2.9 and 2.6% respectively of the total arable area. Since 1989, 
the areas of cereals and oilseeds have increased (by 6 and 104% 
respectively) as there has been a shift to these crops from 
fodder, sugar beet and potatoes. 
In terms of production, the most important crops are cereals 
(see Appendix 2) of which wheat and barley are the main crops 
(Graph 3) with a considerable proportion of the barley (about 
20%) being malting varieties used in beer production and 
export. 
With the exception of 1992 and 1993, when drought adversely 
affected production, Czech cereal output has been greater than 
consumption, which has declined by 17% since 1991 mainly 
due to reduced feed use in the livestock sector (see 
Appendix 2). 
1993 
95 .3 
65.6 
29.7 
9.0 
20.7 
(billion Kcs current prices) 
1994 
93 .8 
63.0 
30.6 
9.5 
21.3 
Note: For more in fo rmation on the agricultural account in 1993 and 1994, see Appendix I. 
Source: YUZE, CSO. 
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GRAPH 3: Cereal production by crop, 1994 (1 OOO tonnes) 
Wheat 3 898 
Barley 2 584 
Source: CSO, VUZE. 
The o ilseed ra pe area and production level has expan ded 
rap idly since 1990 and main ly serv ices domestic demand for 
vegetabl e fats and oi ls. About a fift h of the rapeseed crop is 
planted for non-food uses and thi s particular market is expected 
to incre ase main ly as a res u lt of government investment 
subsidies for establishing processing plants. 
In contrast to the expanding production of cereals and oilseeds, 
sugar beet and potato production has decreased by 28 and 44% 
respective ly since 1989 (see Appendix 2). For both crops the 
decl ine large ly reflects decreasing demand in the Czec h 
Republic (for potatoes especia lly in the livestock sector where 
it has traditionally been used as a feed). 
Overall , the share of crop products in gross agricu ltural output 
has increased since 1989. Whilst total gross agricultural output 
(GAO) decreased by 28 % between 1989 and 1994, crop output 
fell by 2 1 % over the same period, increasing its share of GAO 
from 41 to 45% (see Appendix 2). 
2.2.2. Livestock production 
Whereas the ara ble area decreased little over the 1989-94 
per iod , the Czech li vestock sector experie nced s ign ifican t 
contrac tion in numbers (Table 8) . Cattle and sheep numbers 
have decreased by the greatest va lue ( 42 and 5 1 % 
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respecti vely), with pi gs and poultry affected less ( 18% 
reduction in numbers for both sectors). 
In the milk sector, production has decreased by 39% since 1989 
(see Appendix 2) but is still over 500 million litres higher than 
domestic consumption levels. In the beef/veal sector prod uction 
level s were initi a lly main tained after the economi c reforms 
were in troduced as herd s were li quid a ted by new owners. 
However, since 1992, the production of beef has decreased by 
almo st 50% and is no w at a level lower th an domes ti c 
consumption (see Appendix 2) . 
In the pig meat sector, production levels initiall y remained at 
0 .7 to 0.8 milli on tonnes in the ea rl y years of tran s iti o n; 
however, since 1993, production has decreased by about 26%, 
and whereas a few years ago the Czec h Republi c was a net 
exporter of pig meat, it is now producing at a level lower than 
consumption. 
In the poul try sector , poul try mea t product ion has broadl y 
foll owed trend s in consumpti o n. After initi a l increases in 
producti on (and consumption) as fl ocks were liquidated in the 
ea rl y 1990s, prod uction fe ll fro m about 0 .2 milli on to 0 . 15 
million tonnes. However, since 1993 , production has increased 
sli ghtl y to about 0 .175 million tonnes (see Appendix 2). Egg 
Table 8 
Czech livestock numbers, 1989-95 
1989 1990 199 1 
Cattle 3 48 1 3 506 3 360 
of which COWS I 247 I 236 I 195 
Pigs 4 685 4 790 4 569 
Poultry 32 479 31 981 33 278 
Sheep 399 430 429 
Source: CSO. YUZE. 
production thro ughout the last five years has remained fairly 
stable. 
Overall, the GAO in the livestock sector decreased by 32% 
between 1989 and 1994. This is greater than both the decrease 
in the arable sector and for the entire agricultural sector. In 
terms of its share of total GAO , the livestock sector's share 
decreased from 59% in 1989 to 55 % in 1994. 
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I OOV /u•cul 
1992 1993 1994 1995 
2 950 2 5 10 2 161 2 031 
I 036 975 830 768 
4 609 4 599 4 OOO 3 862 
30 756 28 219 26 800 26 592 
342 254 196 
2.3. Ownership patterns 
The pre-1989 pattern of farm ownership in the Czech Republic 
was as follows (Graph 4). 
State farms. These were run by the State through centrally 
appointed managers and essentially comprised land 
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expro priated in 1948 fro m those expelled (mos tly German 
fo rmer owners) and land conve rted fro m operati on as 
collectives (i.e. failed collectives: see below). 
Collective fa rms. These had their origins in the 1950s when 
farmers/farms were in effect forced to group activities together 
and to operate collectively. All land, buildings , machinery and 
other assets held by individuals at the time became collectively 
owned, operated and managed by the members . Those who 
worked on collective farms included both members and non-
member employees. New employees usually (but not always) 
gained member status on joining whilst those who left usually 
lost their membership status. Nevertheless, there were no clear 
ru les or legal status in respect of asset ownership except that 
those who were original members kept title to the original land 
and assets at time of coll ec ti v ization (i. e. whi lst title to the 
original assets was clear, title to all subsequent assets obtained 
by collectives was not clarified); 
During the 1980s, this type of farm operation (which accounted 
for 61 % of all Czech agricultural land) was given considerable 
free dom to operate as determined by management . 
Consequently, mos t co llectives te nded to pursue private 
(collective) profit goals for which the benefits and profi t were 
distributed amongst members. 
24 
Family farms. These accounted for only 3% of the area farmed 
and were essentially areas of land not taken into State control in 
the 1950s. These were commonly located in margin al 
mountainous regions (and often not considered worthwhile for 
res titution) and small , private household plots. 
Other State Organizations. These operated in the same way as 
State farm s and included Sta te companies owning land on 
which agricultural acti viti es took place, school s and 
municipalities. 
Following the break-up of the former Communist system there 
have been considerable changes to the land ownership patterns 
in the Czech Republic . The main obj ective of Czech policy 
refo rms has been to re-es tabli sh private ownership with 
minimal di sruption to farm structure through a combination of 
restitution and compensation to former owners. Graph 5 shows 
the ownership structure in 1994. Its main features include the 
following. 
Private cooperatives. These cover nearly 50% of total Czech 
agricultural land. This form of ownership mainly ari ses fro m 
the former collectiv e farm s which were transform ed into 
private cooperati ves in 1992 on the bas is of the Collec ti ve 
Farm Transformation Law (this allowed for the 'conversion ' of 
collective farms to farmer cooperatives with members given the 
choice of remaining within a new cooperative entity or farming 
separately as independent, private farmers). The basis for 
establishing ownership of assets held by the collective farms 
was, as indicated above, based on the original owners of land 
and assets in the l 940s/earl y 1950s (making the process 
relatively straightforward). Title/ownership of assets such as 
buildings, machinery and land acquired after collectivization 
was however, more difficult to define. The completion of this 
restitution process is not yet complete and is expected to take 
until 2000 before it is finished. 
Although most of the land operated by former collectives has 
been restored to original owners, the majority have chosen to 
keep their land within cooperatives with on ly 11 % of former 
collectivized land having been withdrawn from the use of 
cooperatives. In effect, the new owners have chosen to lease 
their land/assets back to cooperatives. 
A number of reasons have contributed to this including: many 
of the plots given to individuals were too small to start viable 
farming activities; insecurity and risk associated with farming 
privately as against the security offered by cooperatives; a lack 
of entrepreneurship among the new owners and a lack of 
financial resources with which to develop private farms. 
State farms. Whilst the collective farm transformation 
legislation allowed for the structure of cooperatives to be 
largely maintained, the position for State farms differed 
significantly, with most having been privatized by 1994 (all 
non-land assets had been transferred into private ownership 
together with some land, where clear ownership claims have 
allowed for restitution). Where restitution claims have not yet 
been reso lved, the land has been transferred to the Land Fund 
of the Czech Republic for administration (a government 
institution established to complete the privatization process for 
State-owned assets). This institution has tended to rent all land 
under its control, mostly to potential owners. In 1994, the total 
area under the control of the Land Fund was 881 OOO ha, of 
which 767 OOO ha were allocated for privatization. There are 
no current plans for privatizing the balance of I I 4 OOO ha 
(2.7 % of the total agricultural area). 
Private partnerships, family farms and companies. Together 
these ownership categories account for 49% of the total Czech 
agricultural area. This category mainly comprises private 
owners who have received land restored from State farms and 
those who have withdrawn their cooperative (formerly 
collective) farm interest in order to farm on their own. Within 
this category of ownership (a total of 2.09 million ha), 50% are 
in the form of partnerships, 47 % are family farms (including 
part-time, household plots) and 3% are joint stock companies. 
Overall , there are estimated to be about 3.5 million owners of 
land in the Czec h Republic of which about 2.1 million are 
probably drawn from the urban population and about 1.4 
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million from the rural population (the total rural population is 
about 2.2 million). In terms of area , urban dwellers probably 
account for about 40 % of the total agricultural area so far 
privatized (i.e. 40% of 3.4 million ha which equals 1.36 million 
ha). Almost all of the remaining 767 OOO ha earmarked for 
privatization is expected to be restored to rural dwellers. 
Czech government policy towards any ownership types has not 
shown any preferences for one business form or another , 
although as indicated above , the legi s lation relating to the 
transformation of collectives into cooperatives favoured owners 
remaining in agriculture (either via a cooperative or some other 
form of business type) rather than withdrawing land from 
agriculture. Those deciding not to use the land for agriculture 
are required to repay the value of any privatization asset share 
over seven years (i.e. the value of the administrative price of 
the land). 
2.4. Structure of holdings 
A breakdown of the structure of holdings in the Czech 
Republic is shown in Table 9. This shows that the vast majority 
of landowners (78 % ) in the Czech Republic own plots of less 
than I O ha. However, in terms of area, the majority of the total 
agricultural area (68 %) is accounted for by farm units over 
l OOO ha in size, and farmed by only 1 502 enterprises. 
By type of ownership, private cooperatives account for the vast 
majority of the larger farms, with an average size of I 430 ha 
(Table 10). The remaining State farms have an average size of 
nearly 500 ha, farming companies/partnerships about 830 ha 
with the average size of family farms being about 16 ha. Thus, 
most of the former State farm land that has been restored has 
been in plots of under 20 ha. 
Since the beginning of the reform process in the early 1990s, 
the average size of holdings has tended to decline. The average 
farm size has fallen from 846 ha (1989) to 67 ha in 1994, with 
the number of holdings increasing from 4 403 to 63 662 over 
the same period. This substantial change in average farm size 
largely reflects the polarized nature of farm structure in the 
Czech Republic before the economic reforms of the 1990s, 
when large State-owned farms and collectives dominated. With 
the restitution process the degree of polarization is decreasing, 
with the large State farms being broken up into much smaller 
pieces of land. 
For cooperatives, there has been a slow decline in the average 
size of holding as the number of members withdrawing to farm 
alone or set up other forms of farming businesses has increased. 
For example in 1993, the average cooperative area was 1 587 
ha; this fell to 1 430 ha in 1994. In contrast, the average size of 
holdings for farming partnerships, companies and family farms 
has increased (Table 11). 
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Table 9 
Structure of holdings by size category, 1994 
Size category (ha) No of holdings 
less than I 32 492 
1-10 17 284 
10-30 5 949 
30-50 2 248 
50-100 1 424 
100-500 1 985 
500-1 OOO 778 
over 1 OOO 1 502 
Total 63 662 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture. 
Table 10 
Structure of farms by type of ownership, 1994 
State farms 
Collective farms 
Family farms 
Private cooperatives 
Companies, partnerships and other 
Total 
No of enterprises 
229 
nil 
60 642 
1429 
1 362 
63 662 
Source: Report on Agriculture, 1995 and Ratinger, 1995. 
Table 11 
% share of number 
of holdings 
51 
27 
9 
4 
2 
3 
1 
2 
100 
Total area (ha) 
114 042 
nil 
993 001 
2 043 470 
1 130 487 
4 281 OOO 
Changes in the average size of holding by ownership type, 1989-94 
Area (ha) % of total area 
813 390 19 
556 530 13 
2 911 080 68 
4 281 OOO 100 
Average size (ha) 
498 
nil 
16.37 
1 430 
830 
67.24 
hecrares 
State farm Collective Cooperative Farming partnership Farming companies Family farms 
1989 6 261 2 561 4 
1991 3 558 2 191 10 
1993 2168 1 587 726 567 15 
1994 498 1430 840 820 16 
Source: Ratinger, Report on agriculture, 1995. 
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2.5. Land tenure 
Table 12 illustrates the breakdown of the land market in Czech 
agriculture. This shows that renting dominates, accounting for 
85% of the total utilizable agricultural area (TUAA). Land in 
agricultural production and used by its owners accounts for 
only 12% of the total TUAA and is predominantly found 
amongst family farms, although about 20 and 12% respectively 
of farming company and partnership land is farmed by the 
owners. Consequently, even where land has been restored to 
private owners, most owners have chosen to rent out the land to 
others for farming. 
Table 12 
Land tenure in Czech agriculture, 1994 
Ownership 
State farms 
Collective farms 
Private cooperatives 
Farming companies 
Partnerships 
Family farms 
Other (including non-agricultural enterprises) 
Total 
Privately owned 
and operated 
nil 
0 
0 
11 969 
124 622 
381 488 
nil 
518 079 
Annex 
2.6. The land market 
As indicated in the section above, renting currently dominates 
the Czech land market, with only 12% of the current TUAA 
being farmed by the owners of the land. 
The market for land in the Czech agricultural sector is still in 
an immature state of development and is heavily influenced by 
the government. There is no transparent free market for land 
with the only prices quoted being the administrative prices, set 
by the government as a basis for valuing State farm land 
restored to private owners. The administrative prices have their 
% total 
agricultural area 
0 
0 
0 
0.3 
2.9 
8.9 
0 
12.1 
Rented 
114 042 
0 
2 043 470 
47 716 
914 191 
611 513 
12 796 
3 743 728 
hecwres 
% total 
agricultural area 
2.7 
0 
47.7 
1.1 
21.4 
14.3 
0.2 
87.4 
Note: The remaining 19 193 ha (total agricultural land area of 4 281 OOO ha) was not rented out by the State sector. 
Source: Ratinger, Report on agriculture, 1995. 
Table 13 
Czech administrative prices for land, 1994 
Administrative Average Area in band % of total Arable land % of arable % of total 
price band price in band (ha) agricultural in each band area agricultural 
(ECU/ha) (ECU/ha) land (ha) area 
less than 590 543 13 059 0.4 3 947 0.1 0.1 
590-880 775 552 549 12.9 321 768 10.2 7.5 
880-1 170 1 034 1 100 491 25.7 744 696 23.6 17.4 
1170-1470 1 286 975 621 22.8 715 778 22.7 16.7 
1470-1 760 1 589 191 448 4.5 154 756 4.9 3.6 
1 760-2 060 1 904 424 631 9.9 347 422 11.0 8.1 
2 060-2 350 2 211 472 913 11.0 391 824 12.4 9.1 
over 2 350 2496 550 237 12.8 477 977 15.1 11.3 
Total 1 486 4 280 949 100 3 158 168 100 73.8 
Source: Ratinger, Report on agriculture, 1995. 
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origins in Decree 178/ 1994 from the Ministry of Finance and 
are based on land quality (reflecting production potential and 
factors such as soil quality). Table 13 shows the breakdown of 
average administrative prices in 1994, the administrative price 
bands and the area of land in each price band. 
The key features of Table 13 are: 
(i) the average administrative land price is ECU 1 486/ha 
within a range of ECU 543/ha for the poorest quality land 
to ECU 2 496/ha for the best quality land; 
(ii) land administratively valued at over ECU 2 060/ha 
accounts for about 24% of the total agricultural area and 
land valued at over ECU 1 170/ha accounts for 61 % of 
the total agricultural area; 
(iii) arable land valued over ECU 2 060/ha accounts for 20.4% 
of the total agricultural area. 
There are no published data relating to the extent to which 
agricultural land is traded in the Czech Republic. The 
administrative prices referred to in effect set the price for 
restitution or compensation to private owners. Since the 
majority of land in the Czech Republic has been either restored 
and/or converted from collectives to cooperatives, the use of 
administrative land prices for setting compensation levels has 
not applied to a large area of land. 
There are also no empirical data relating to the extent to which 
land is traded. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some (very 
small) areas of land are, however, being traded at prices 
significantly above the administrative price levels (two to three 
times higher) mainly for household/garden plots, as is higher 
quality arable land often located near cities such as Brno and 
Prague. 
Like the market for agricultural land, the rental market is also 
extremely immature and heavily influenced by administrative 
(government-influenced) prices. The primary influence on the 
rental sector has been the stipulation in the cooperative 
transformation legislation that rents paid by cooperatives to 
members and other landowners are recommended to be at least 
equal to 1 % of the administrative price for each plot of land. 
Out of the rented land currently used in agricultural production 
( about 85% of the total agricultural area) about 80% of this area 
(about 2.9 million ha) is estimated to be rented out at prices 
slightly above 1 % of the administrative price. In addition, the 
lessee also pays as rent (by taking responsibility for paying) 
any land tax due (which is 0.75% of the administrative price of 
land). There are however, no current (1995) empirical studies 
that have examined the land rental market in the Czech 
Republic. 
Overall, the land market does not currently operate in the same 
way as occurs in EU countries (i.e. there is no established 
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market). The market remains highly influenced by govern-
mental/institutional factors: 
(i) about 900 OOO ha or about 21 % of the total agricultural 
area remains in State ownership or is awaiting 
privatization; 
(ii) there is a general lack of liquidity and capital in the sector, 
especially as banks are currently reluctant to accept land 
as collateral for loans; 
(iii) information and market transparency relating to returns 
per hectare is limited. There are no current empirical 
studies examining returns to land compared with land 
rents although if average rents (estimated by the Report on 
Agriculture, 1995, to be about ECU 21/ha) are compared 
with an estimate of the average return per ha of ECU 
-9.4/ha (source: Report on Agriculture, 1995) it is clear 
that currently a considerable part of Czech agriculture 
does not realize sufficient returns from agriculture alone 
to cover costs of production, even without taking into 
consideration land rents and tax. The reader should, 
however, note that the data referred to above are average 
values and probably hide considerable variations within 
the sector; 
(iv) the administratively influenced rent levels are widely 
perceived to be relatively high (this is not surprising, 
bearing in mind the average return figures referred to 
above); 
(v) land ownership is a relatively new experience for many 
people. As a result, they are not aware of the potential 
value of land as a tradeable commodity; 
(vi) as current returns per hectare for many are negative, this 
discourages interest in land renting and buying; 
(v) there are still a number of outstanding restitution claims, 
some cases in which it is difficult to identify precise 
ownership. 
2. 7. The market for and use of labour 
The key features relating to the use of labour in Czech 
agriculture since economic refonns began are as follows (Table 
14). 
(i) There has been a virtual halving in the numbers employed 
in agriculture, from about 533 OOO in 1989 to 246 OOO in 
1994. 1 As the total agricultural area has declined little 
over the same period, there has also been a halving in 
average use of labour per hectare. 
(ii) The average use of labour per hectare is lowest for family 
farms. This is mainly attributed to the low level of animal 
production on family farms relative to other ownership 
types and to their better utilization of labour than 
cooperatives, partnerships and State farms which are 
perceived to be placing greater emphasis on broad social 
1 About 20% of this decrease can probably be attributed to statistical 
reclassification and redefinition. 
Table 14 
Annex 
welfare objectives such as maintaining employment than 
profit-related objectives. 
The changes in the use of labour in Czech agriculture have 
been made against a background of a relatively low level of 
general unemployment in the economy and the attraction of 
non-agricultural occupations with higher wage levels (Table 
15). 
Traditionally agricultural wages were higher than wages in 
other sectors due to political preference given to the sector 
under the former Communist regime (e.g. in 1989 the average 
wage in agriculture was Kcs 41 460 (about ECU 1 810) 
compared with Kcs 28 040 (ECU 1 224) for the economy as a 
whole. However, by 1993 this relationship had changed in 
favour of non-agricultural wages (average agricultural wage 
Key features relating to use of labour in Czech agriculture, 1989-94 
Agricultural labour force 
(including owners) (numbers) 
State farms 
Collectives 
Private coops 
Farming companies 
Partnerships 
Family farms 
Total 
1989 
127 865 
404 992 
nil 
nil 
nil 
200 
533 057 
Note: Family farms 1994 includes 13 360 hired employees. 
Source: Ratinger, Report on agriculture, 1995. 
Table 15 
Average agricultural wages, 1989-94 
1994 
5 300 
0 
146 450 
4 061 
58 831 
31 217 
245859 
Average agricultural Index (current) 
wage kcs/year 
1989 41460 100 
1990 44 304 106.9 
1991 45 492 109.7 
1992 50 880 122.7 
1993 61 980 149.5 
1994 70 752 170.7 
Source: Stikova, 1995; Divita, 1995. 
Average No of labour/ha 
1989 
0.12 
0.15 
0.16 
0.12 
Real index Index: industrial 
wages 
100 100 
97.2 102.8 
63.7 120.6 
64.2 143.7 
64.7 176.7 
67.1 206.5 
Average No of labour/ha 
1994 
0.046 
0.07 
0.06 
0.06 
0.031 
0.06 
Real index: 
industrial wages 
100 
93.5 
70.0 
75.1 
76.5 
81.2 
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was Kcs 61 980) (ECU I 817) compared with Kcs 68 400 
(ECU 2 005) for the non-agricultural sector). This is further 
illustrated by the trends in wages between the sectors (Table 
15). 
Whilst agricultural wages rose by over 70% in the period 1989-
94, in real terms they decreased by a third (there has, however, 
been a 4% real increase since 1991). This compares with a 
106% increase in nominal industrial wages and a 19% decrease 
in real industrial wages over the same period. 
Although the above data suggest that much of the shedding of 
agricultural labour may be partially attributable to the relatively 
higher level of wages in non-agricultural sectors, the scope for 
movement out of agriculture to other occupations is limited in 
some regions. In particular, those located in less favoured areas 
(those with average income levels below 75% of the national 
average) have not been able to find alternative employment, 
resulting in relatively high levels of either real unemployment 
or underemployment (i.e. staff retained within agricultural 
enterprises even though their activity and contribution is 
limited). 
2.8. Agricultural income 
Between 1989 and 1994, the level of agricultural household 
income in the Czech Republic increased by 77% in nominal 
terms from Kcs 80 600 in 1989 to Kcs 142 650 in 1994. 
However, in real terms, the level of income decreased by 30%. 
This is similar to the real decrease in agricultural wages (33%) 
but greater than the decrease in non-agricultural wages ( 19%) 
referred to in subsection 2.7 above. Over the same period, the 
proportion of total agricultural income accounted for by non-
Table 16 
Agricultural income, 1989-94 
agricultural sources of income increased from 24.3% in 1989 to 
28.6% in 1994 (Table 17). 
Overall, Czech agriculture is currently considered to be 
unprofitable (Table 18) with more than half of the total losses 
in the sector being concentrated in the remaining State farms 
(i.e. the State farms are the most unprofitable elements of the 
sector and account for over half of the total losses in the 
sector). 
The real changes in agricultural income and wages referred to 
illustrate how the agricultural sector has suffered greater real 
decreases in income levels than most other sectors of the 
economy and partly explains why there has been a movement 
of labour out of the sector. However, it should be recognized 
that the ability of surplus labour in agriculture to find 
alternative employment has varied between regions (those in 
less-favoured areas have been faced with little alternative 
employment). The only alternative facing many in agriculture 
and rural areas has, therefore, been to seek additional and 
alternative jobs (or to set up non-agricultural businesses) 
outside agriculture. The evidence of Table 17 suggests that 
some have chosen this strategy. The reader should note that 
there is also very little empirical information relating to the 
extent to which part-time farming is practised. However, it is 
likely that part-time farming is concentrated amongst farms 
under 10 ha in size, and in family farms. Agricultural income is 
also likely to provide for only part of the total household 
income in households where an owner of land has chosen to 
keep the land within a cooperative farming enterprise. In such 
cases, the landowner is often working full-time in agriculture 
with the cooperative, but other members of the family may be 
involved in non-farming activities. 
Total household income Real income (Kcs) 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
% change (1989-94) 
Source: Stikova 1995; Divila 1995. 
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Kcs ECU 
80 602.5 
87 978 
93 749 
108 193 
125 941 
142 650 
+ 77% 
3 520 
2 410 
2 561 
3 173 
3 693 
4 183 
+ 19% 
80 602 
80 272 
56 373 
60 988 
63 542 
68 516 
-15% 
Table 17 
Agricultural household income by source, 1989-94 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Source: Stikova 1995; Divila 1995. 
Table 18 
% agricultural activity 
75.7 
73.7 
70.3 
69.3 
71.3 
71.4 
Agricultural account for the Czech Republic (extract), 1992-94 
Net value added at factor cost 
Salaries/wages 
Rents 
Interest 
Profit/loss 
Source: CSO, VUZE. 
2.9. Labour migration 
1992 
18.1 
23.1 
0.9 
3.9 
-9.8 
Although subsection 2.7 above refers to a virtual 50% 
reduction in the Czech agricultural labour force since 1990, 
there is little empirical data or information about population 
migration in the country. Over the last 10 years, it is estimated 
that about 0.5 million inhabitants moved out of rural areas to 
urban areas. However, the primary reason for this migration is 
1993 
19.7 
22.1 
1.2 
4.3 
-7.9 
% non-agricultural activity 
24.3 
26.3 
29.7 
30.7 
28.7 
28.6 
1994 
21.4 
22.0 
1.6 
4.5 
-6.7 
Annex 
Kcs billion 
perceived to have been government investment in the provision 
of urban housing ( which stopped in 1991) and a general long-
term trend, especially amongst younger elements of the 
population, in favour of urban rather than rural life. The effect 
of reduced levels of agricultural employment is perceived to 
have had a modest impact on the rural-urban migration of 
population, although no empirical studies have been undertaken 
to examine the issue. 
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3. Poland 
3.1. The position of agriculture in the Polish 
economy 
In 1994, agriculture in Poland contributed to about 6.3% of 
total GDP (Table 19). This represents an important but 
declining share, as the sector's contribution to GDP has fallen 
from 8.4% in 1990. During the first few years of economic 
transition from a command to a more market-oriented 
economy, Polish GDP initially decreased until 1991 after which 
the economy moved into recovery. In the agricultural sector, 
gross output, whilst variable has tended to decrease by a greater 
amount than general GDP over the same period, with the low 
point in production occurring a year later than GDP in 1992. 
Production in subsequent years has exhibited a degree of 
recovery although droughts in the summers of 1992 and 1994 
adversely affected gross agricultural output in both of these 
years. Overall, when compared with other sectors in the Polish 
economy and total GDP, the decline has been more marked in 
agriculture (Table 20). 
Table 19 
Important economic indicators in the Polish economy, 1990-95 
% change in real GDP 
% change in consumer prices 
% unemployed 
Exchange rate new ZI: ECU 
% share of GDP accounted for by agriculture" 
1 Estimate. 
' Including forestry. 
Source: GUS, OECD, DG II. European Commission. 
Table 20 
1990 
- 11.6 
+ 618 
6.3 
12.055 
8.4 
The supply balance position/degree of self-sufficiency of 
Poland has also changed in recent years. In the late 1970s and 
during most of the 1980s Poland was a net importer of food and 
agricultural products. By the end of the 1980s it briefly became 
a net exporter of food and agricultural products, but by 1993 it 
had reverted back to becoming a net importer. 
A contributory factor to the poor relative performance in gross 
agricultural product (GAP) terms has been the slower rate of 
growth in agricultural prices compared with the general consumer 
price index (CPI) and agricultural input prices (Graph 6). 
The share of food products in total consumption in Poland is 
high by comparison with EU countries (although it is declining 
in relative importance). For example, in 1986 food expenditure 
accounted for 38% of total private consumption, whilst in 1992 
it accounted for 29% of total consumption. 
Agriculture accounts for the employment of about one quarter 
of the total Polish workforce, which when compared with the 
sector's contribution to GDP (6.3%), illustrates that it is a 
sector with a relatively low level of labour productivity. 
1991 
- 7.0 
+ 71 
11.8 
13.07 
6.9 
1992 
+ 2.6 
+ 42 
13.6 
17.67 
6.9 
1993 
+ 3.8 
+ 35 
16.4 
21.22 
6.8 
1994 
+ 5.0 
+ 32 
16.1 
26.9 
6.3 
1995 1 
+ 5.0 
+ 25 
16.0 
Indices of Polish gross domestic product (GDP) and gross agricultural product (GAP) 
Year 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1 Estimate. 
Source: GUS !993. 1994, 1995. 
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GDP 
100.0 
100.2 
88.4 
93.0 
102.6 
103.8 
105.01 
GAP 
100.0 
101.5 
97.8 
98.4 
87.2 
106.8 
90.7 
Table 21 
Indices of GAP by main types of enterprise, 1988-94 
Y~ar 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
S011rce: GUS. 
S t:ll~ farms 
100.0 
103.5 
99.8 
90.6 
67.2 
67.4 
Politically , agriculture is a lso an important sec tor. Farmers are 
represented in parliament by the Polish Peasant Party with 13 1 
seats (out of the total 460) and it is the second largest party in 
parliament after th e post-Communi sts (SLD - Alliance for 
De mocratic Left). Both parties have bee n in vo lved in 
government since December 1993 and it is ev ident that farmers 
Coo peratives 
100.0 
102.6 
100.9 
98.2 
77. 1 
90.7 
Pri ,·,ne fa r 111 , 
100.0 
101.0 
97.2 
100.2 
91.8 
110.6 
92.1 
An nex 
have a strong and sign ificant influence over policy direction in 
Poland. 
State farms and cooperatives experienced the largest decreases 
in gross agricultural output due mainly to the el imin ation of a 
number of direct subsidies to the agricultural sector (Tab le 2 1 ). 
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GRAPH 7: Polish agricultural land use, 1994 
Arable 76.5% 
Base: 18 700 (I OOO ha) 
Source: GUS . DG VI European Commission. 
3.2. Agricul tural production 
The total utilizable agricultural area in Poland in 1994 was 18.7 
million ha. Within th is, arable land is the most important (1 4. 3 
milli on ha) . fo ll owed by meadows, permanent pasture and 
perm anent crops with 2.4, 1.6 and 0 .4 million ha respective ly 
(Graph 7). 
3.2.1. Land use 
The share of to tal agri cultural land use accounted for by arable 
crops has re ma in ed fa irl y s table s ince 1989 , with the to ta l 
arable area dec reas ing by onl y 0.8% between 1989 and 1994 
(Tabl e 22). 
Cereals account for 59% of agricultural land use (mostly wheat, 
rye and barl ey), with potatoes being the other main crop grown 
(acco untin g fo r 12% of a rab le land use ) . S in ce 1989 , the 
cerea ls and pulses areas have increased by 2. 1 % each whilst the 
areas of sugar beet, oil seed rape and potatoes have decreased 
by 5.2, 35. 1 and 8.7% respecti ve ly. 
In terms of gross agricultural production, cereal s have been the 
second most important sector accounting fo r 15 to 19% of GAP 
in recent years (pi g meat is the largest contributor to GAP with 
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Permanent pasture 8.6% 
20%) . Of the other arable sec tors, potatoes account for about 
10% of GAP, and oi lseed rape about 5% of GAP. Overall , the 
crop sec tor 's share of GAP in 1994 was about 58 %. Thi s is a 
s imil a r leve l to the 1989 share but higher than th e share in 
1990-93 when a significant proportion of the livestock sector 
was be ing liquidated. 
3.2.2. Crop production 
T able 23 summar izes recent trend s in crop production in 
Poland. A key feature of recent production has been sign ificant 
annual vari ati ons. This can be attributed mostly to: 
(i) price instabi lity (for both inputs and output) in the period 
1990-94; 
(ii) bad weather ( 1992 harvest); 
(iii) yield variations due to bad weather ( 1992) and reductions 
in the use of inputs such as ferti lizers. 
A summary of recent yield variations is shown in Table 24. 
Annex 
Table 22 
Polish arable land use, 1989-94 
I OOO ha 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Cereals 8 377 8 531 8 716 8 321 8 506 8 481 
Sugar beet 423 440 361 376 400 400 
Oilseed rape 570 SOO 468 417 348 370 
Potatoes 1 859 1 835 1 733 1 757 1 761 1 697 
Pulses 386 318 330 335 333 394 
Other crops 2 799 2 764 2 752 3 131 2 957 2 958 
Total 14 414 14 388 14 360 14 337 14 305 14 300 
Source: FAO, DG VI European Commission. 
Table 23 
Crop production, 1986/90 and 1991-94 
1 OOO IOIIIIC.S 
Product l 986/90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
annual average 
Cereals 26 114 27 811 19 962 23 417 21 763 
wheat 8 103 9 270 7 368 8 243 7 658 
rye 6 330 5 900 3 981 4992 5 300 
barley 4135 4 257 2 819 3 255 2 686 
Legumes 555 680 380 411 215 
Potatoes 36 140 29 038 23 388 36 270 23 058 
Sugar beet 14 674 11 412 11 052 15 621 11 676 
Oilseed rape 1 306 1 057 769 606 777 
Source: GUS 1995. 
Table 24 
Yields: 1986/90 and 1991-94 
1om1e.s per hcctan• 
Product 1986/90 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Cereals 3.11 3.19 2.4 2.75 2.57 
wheat 3.75 3.8 3.06 3.33 3.18 
rye 2.57 2.58 1.96 2.26 2.18 
barley 3.32 3.44 2.35 2.79 2.6 
Legumes 1.68 2.06 1.08 1.89 1.35 
Potatoes 19 16.8 13.3 20.6 13.6 
Sugar beet 34.6 31.6 29.4 39.2 29.2 
Oilseed rape 2.5 2.19 1.76 1.67 1.95 
Source: GUS 1995a. 
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Table 25 
Polish livestock numbers, 1989-94 
1989 1990 1991 
Cattle 10 391 10 049 9 024 
of which COWS 4 885 4 878 4 707 
Pigs 18 835 19 464 19 737 
Poultry 66 188 71 512 61 307 
Sheep 4409 4 158 3 234 
Source: DG VI. European Commission. GUS. 
3.2.3. Livestock and animal products 
Whilst the arable area has remained fairly constant over the last 
five years, the Polish livestock sector has experienced 
considerable decline (Table 25). Sheep and cattle numbers have 
decreased by the greatest amount (80 and 30% respectively) 
with pigs and poultry least affected; in fact pigs and poultry 
numbers initially increased in the early 1990s. 
The production of beef in Poland peaked at 725 OOO tonnes in 
1990, representing the highest production figure over the period 
1980-93. However, since 1990, production has decreased by 
38% to 450 OOO tonnes in 1994. This mainly reflects initial 
sales of animals restored to private ownership in 1990, 
followed by a decline in output in line with significant 
decreases in cattle prices and the shake out in cattle numbers in 
the dairy sector. 
In contrast to beef output, pig production has remained fairly 
stable. Production has remained around the 1.9 to 2.0 million 
tonne level since 1990. This has occurred despite significant 
declines in the real prices for pig meat, although pig farmers 
Table 26 
Polish livestock production, 1989-94 
1989 1990 
Beef 637 725 
Pig meat 1 854 1 854 
Poultry meat 362 332 
Milk 16 404 15 832 
1994 = estimate. 
Source: DG VI, European Commission, GUS 1995. 
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1 OOO head 
1992 1993 1994 % change 
1989-94 
8 029 7 596 7 270 - 30 
4 363 4 108 3 866 - 21 
20 725 21 058 17 422 -7 
59 443 54 680 53 330 - 19 
I 870 1 268 890 - 80 
have to some extent been cushioned by cuts in feed prices 
which have helped to maintain profitability levels at a level 
higher than that for cattle. For 1994, however, production is 
expected to decrease significantly. 
Poultry production has also remained relatively stable over the 
last five years fluctuating between 305 OOO (1993) and 362 OOO 
tonnes (1991). 
Milk production fell 27% between 1989 and 1994 (Table 26). 
This has been mainly due to falling real prices for milk. This 
has led to declining profitability and a large number of dairy 
cows have been slaughtered. 
3.3. Ownership patterns 
Whereas in most of the other Central and East European 
Countries, nearly all agricultural land used to be in the hands of 
collectives and State farms, Poland has been a major exception, 
1 OOO tonnes 
1991 1992 1993 1994 
662 544 480 450 
1 947 2 036 1 903 1 609 
333 322 305 335 
14 442 13 153 12 639 11 920 
GRAPH 8: Polish farm ownership pattern, 1989 
Base: 18 914 Cl 000) ha. 
Source: GUS. 
Private (individual) farmers 72.1 % 
with the private sector dominating production and ownership 
under the Communist system (Graph 8). 
Prior to the beginning of the economic transition in 1989, 
private ownership accounted for 76% of the total agricultural 
land area (over 14.3 million ha), with about 4.5 million ha 
(24% of the total) under State control. In relation to the number 
of farms, private farms accounted for over 99% of the total 
(2.143 million out of a total 2.146 million in 1989) . This 
ownership pattern has remained largely unaltered since 1989 
with no significant changes in the pattern of ownership by 
1994; the proportion of the total agricultural area accounted for 
by private, individual farmers and companies has increased to 
91 %, as the land privatization programme, started at the 
beginning of 1993, has begun to talce effect with the passing of 
the Land Privatization Act (Table 27). Out of the nearly 2 
million farms in Poland, the majority are estimated to be owned 
by people who live on, and derive income from, their holdings 
with less than 5% of all holdings (and less than 1 % of the total 
area) estimated to be owned by people who do not farm them in 
either a full or part-time capacity. There are, however, no 
empirical studies that have examined this issue in Poland. 
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Private cooperatives 3.9% 
The remarnrng State-owned farms and collectives are 
concentrated in the north and west regions of Poland where 
they account for about 40% of the agricultural land used 
compared with the national average of 13%. Private farms are 
more dominant in the central, southern and eastern regions. 
Table 27 
Polish farm ownership, 1994 
State farms 
Collectives 
Family farms 
Other private 
Total 
Source: GUS, 1995. 
Number of farms 
1.1 
2.0 
1 967 
1.2 
1 971 
Area (ha) 
I 778 
600 
14 932 
1 290 
18 600 
I OOO 
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GRAPH 9: Number of farms by farm size 
800 -+------
600 _..... ____ _ 
400 
200 
0 
Source: GUS 1993, 1995. 
3.4. Structure of agricultural holdings 
There are currently about 2 million farms in Poland (Graph 9). 
Over the period 1989-94, the number of farms decreased by 
about 175 OOO. The average farm size has increased from 6.3 to 
9.6 ha. Graph 9 shows that the size group 2 to 5 ha is the largest 
group, with about 750 OOO farms (equ al to about 35 % of the 
total number of farms) . Nevertheless, the number of farms in 
this size group appears to be falli ng. The smallest farms (1 to 
1.9 ha) account for the second largest size group (380 OOO 
farms or 18% of the total number of farms) . The number of 
farms larger than 15 ha is the smallest size group accounting 
for 6% of all farms, although the 1994 data suggest that there 
have been significant recent increases in the numbers in this 
size group. There is a relatively small (but increasing) number 
of farms over 50 ha in size ; 6 672 farms which account for 
only 0.3% of the total number of farms. 
Farms of size 10 to 14.9 accounted fo r the largest part of 
agricultural land in Poland up to 1992 (22 % : Graph 10), with 
the next most significant size groups being 7 to 9.9 ha and more 
than 15 ha, which accounted for about 20% each of the 
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agricultural area. However, in the last two to three years (based 
on 1994 data) there have been notable increases in the total area 
accounted for by farms larger than 15 ha and decreases in the 
area accounted for by all other groups except for the smallest 
size group; 1 to 1.9 ha. 
A breakdown of the structure of Polish agriculture by region is 
shown in Table 29. A regional map is shown in Appendix 4. 
The smallest farms exist in the south-sast region of Poland 
(where private farms dominate) with the largest in the north 
and north-west regions (where the remaining State farms are 
concentrated) . Over the period 1987-94, the increase in the 
average size of farms has tended to be greatest in those 
voivodships listed in Table 28 as 'with large farms' . 
3.5. The market for agricultural land in Poland 
With Poland' s long history of private ownership of agricultural 
land , the vast majority of agricultural land in Poland (over 
GRAPH 10: Area occupied by farm size 
Area in 1 OOO ha 
1985 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1994 
80%) is farmed by landowners, with renting mainly associated 
with new privatized State farms. Nevertheless, where land is 
traded (i.e. sales or establishment of new rental agreements), 
renting is the most common form of transaction (Table 29). Of 
the 946 OOO ha of land traded in 1994, 77 % was rented and 
only 23% sold. About 154 OOO farms were involved in renting 
in 1994 compared with 64 OOO farms involved in land sales. 
Since 1993, the area rented has almost doub led; this being 
mainly attributable to the privatization of State farms which 
started in 1993. 
The other key features relating to land transactions in the 
period 1993 and 1994 were: 
(i) the area of land subject to trade/transfer increased by 35% 
between 1993 and 1994, and was equivalent to about 7 to 
8% of the total Polish agricultural area in 1994; 
(ii) of land sold, 70% is between private farmers and 30% 
between farmers and institutions/companies; 
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(iii) in the rented sector, 44% is rented between private 
farmers and 56% by farmers from institutions (mainly the 
Agricultural Property Agency (APA) established in 1992 
to administer the privatization of State farms); 
(iv) there is a significant area of land (0.4 million ha) subject 
to transfers/exchanges (without payment) - these mainly 
comprise inheritance, gifts and some cases where farmers 
exchange their land with the APA in return for a State 
pension (where they would not have otherwise qualified 
for a pension); 
(v) the average area per transaction is about 4 ha, although 
areas subject to renting tend to have a higher average area 
per transaction (4.8 ha) . Where renting has occurred from 
the APA the average size was 13.3 ha. 
Each of these components of the land market is discussed 
further in the subsections below. 
39 
The CAP and enlargement economic effects of the compensatory payments 
Table 28 
Regional breakdown of Polish agricultural structure 
Voivodship = region 
(similar to British county) 1987 
with small farms 3.6 
Nowy Saez 3.5 
Tarn6w 3.4 
Krakow 3.0 
Krosno 3.2 
Rzesz6w 3.3 
Bielsko-Biala 2.6 
Przemysl 3.8 
Tarnobrzeg 4.3 
Kieke 4.5 
Czestochowa 4.6 
with large farms 10.2 
Slupsk 10.2 
Szczecin 9.2 
Koszalin 10.3 
Olszkyn 12.1 
Pila 10.3 
Suwalki 11.5 
Elblag 11.1 
Gorz6w Wielkopolski 8.5 
Bydgoszcz 9.7 
Poznan 9.2 
Source: Ostrowski (1995). 
Table 29 
Land transactions in 1993 and 1994 
Description 
Total traded and transferred 
A. Total traded 
1. Land sales 
(a) between farmers 
(b) between farmers and institutions 
• bought by farmers 
• sold by farmers 
2. Rented land 
(a) between farmers 
(b) between farmers and institutions 
• rented from APA 
• land returned to APA after renting 
B. Land not traded but transferred 
1. Inherited 
2. Gift 
3. Exchanged for pension 
Average size of farm in hectares 
1990 1994 
3.7 '4.3 
3.5 3.7 
3.5 3.9 
3.0 4.1 
3.3 4.1 
3.3 4.1 
2.6 4.3 
3.8 4.4 
4.5 4.7 
4.6 4.9 
4.8 5.2 
10.6 15.0 
10.4 19.8 
9.5 16.5 
10.7 16.4 
12.6 16.3 
10.7 15.5 
12.0 14.7 
11.5 14.6 
8.9 12.5 
9.9 12.1 
9.3 12.0 
1993 1994 
area in 1 OOO ha area in 1 OOO ha 
1 004.2 1 353.1 
599.3 946.4 
213.2 214.4 
166.6 151.1 
46.6 65.3 
41.1 59.3 
5.5 6.0 
386.1 730.0 
295.5 320.0 
90.6 410.0 
82.3 400.0 
8.3 10.0 
404.9 406.7 
266.0 273.5 
126.3 124.6 
12.6 8.6 
Note: APA stands for Agricultural Property Agency which was created in 1992 to deal with land privatization. 
Source: Ostrowski ( 1995). 
40 
% of farms in 1994 
< 5 ha > 15 ha 
81.6 0.5 
84.3 0.3 
83.0 0.1 
86.8 0.2 
87.0 1.0 
85.2 0.1 
94.4 0.2 
77.7 0.5 
83.0 0.1 
65.9 0.7 
68.3 1.7 
34.3 27.7 
34.4 29.2 
41.2 25.4 
36.5 26.9 
30.2 35.4 
36.2 27.7 
24.0 32.5 
26.6 33.8 
43.8 19.6 
33.4 24.6 
36.2 22.3 
1994 1994 
Average area per No of farms 
transaction ha involved in 
transactions in 1 OOO 
4.1 330.4 
4.4 217.4 
3.4 63.9 
3.0 50.4 
4.8 13.5 
5.7 10.5 
2.0 3.0 
4.8 153.5 
2.7 118.5 
11.7 35.0 
13.3 30.0 
2.0 5.0 
3.6 113.0 
5.0 54.7 
2.2 55.6 
3.2 2.7 
3.6. Developments in the Polish land market since 
transition 
There are two distinct components to the Polish land market. 
These are: 
(i) the private market where land is freely traded with market 
conditions of supply and demand determining prices. This 
is known as the farmers' market; 
(ii) the institutional market where State-owned land is sold by 
the Agricultural Property Agency (APA). This covers all 
land owned by the State and earmarked for privatization 
and is known as the APA market. 
Each of these markets is discussed below. 
3.6.1. Farmers' market 
The annual average prices for land in the Polish farmers' 
market are shown in Table 30. In 1994, the average price for 
agricultural land was ECU 706/ha although this was within a 
range of ECU 420 to 993/ha according to land quality. 
Nominally the average price of land has increased by 332% 
between 1990 and 1994. In ecu terms, the nominal increase 
over the same period was 93% illustrating the devaluation of 
the zloty against the ecu. In real zloty terms, the average land 
price has increased by 55% (1990-94) although since 1993 it 
has fallen by 8.6%. Amongst private farmers there is a 
widespread perception that land prices are currently too low 
and do not reflect their real value, although factors contributing 
to the lack of demand for land have been a lack of capital/funds 
in the private farming community and the low level of farming 
profitability. 
At a regional level, there are significant land price differences 
(Table 31). The most expensive land is in the southern region 
Table 30 
Market prices for arable land and meadows, 1990-94 
Description 1990 1991 
Zl ECU Zl ECU 
Average for arable land 440 365 880 673 
good quality soil 
medium quality soil 
poor quality soil 
good quality meadow 
poor quality meadow 
Note: ZI = new zloty. 
Source: GUS, Ostrowski (1995). 
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of Poland where almost all holdings are small and private, and 
near large cities like Warsaw, Krakow or Katowice. The most 
expensive land in Nowy Saez can be attributed to the relative 
shortage of usable agricultural land in this mountainous region 
and the relatively high level of demand for land for non-
agricultural purposes (mainly tourism - skiing). The cheapest 
land is in the north-west and west regions. In these regions the 
supply of land has increased as a result of the privatization of 
State farms, which are concentrated in these regions. 
3.6.2. APA market 
Although the main form of land contract traded by the APA is 
renting, the Agency does sell some land. In 1994, the average 
APA land price was ECU 509/ha, some 28% lower than the 
average farmer market land price. The APA land price tends to 
be lower than the farmer market price in most regions although 
there are some examples of similar prices (e.g. south and 
south-west) and higher prices (e.g. the north). This largely 
reflects: 
(i) most APA land is sold jointly with other privatized assets 
such as buildings, machinery and animals. Buyers are 
therefore obliged to purchase these assets with the land in 
order to maintain a manageable farm unit capable of 
continuing in farming; 
(ii) some privatized State farm land is sold with the 
outstanding debts of the farm. The price therefore reflects 
this additional burden; 
(iii) APA land is sold by a tender process in which potential 
buyers bid/offer prices for the land. This has tended to 
force prices down in most regions where demand is 
limited although, where demand for land is greatest, 
prices are higher (e.g. north) or similar (e.g. south). 
1992 1993 1994 
Zl ECU Zl ECU Zl ECU 
1 180 668 1590 749 1 900 706 
1 690 956 2 240 1 056 2 670 993 
1 150 651 1 590 749 1900 706 
700 396 940 443 1 130 420 
I 360 770 2 080 773 
840 475 1 210 450 
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Table 31 
Land prices in selected voivodships in 1994 
Voivodship ECU/ha by land quality type 
average good poor 
High-price voivodship 1182 1584 732 
Nowy Saez 1 971 2 673 1104 
Krakow 1 617 2 064 863 
Warsaw 1 312 1 610 937 
Kakowice 1 149 1 431 874 
Lomza 1 082 1 539 617 
Tarn6w 970 1 335 606 
Krosno 937 1 268 628 
Leszno 937 1 268 632 
Skierniewice 937 1 312 517 
Kalisz 926 1 363 532 
Low-price voivodship 387 539 231 
Gorz6w Wielkopolski 290 383 178 
Zielona G6ra 305 435 175 
Koszalin 312 428 216 
Suwalki 349 517 197 
Olsztyn 387 569 201 
Chelm 402 517 297 
Szczecin 435 550 301 
Legnica 446 587 301 
Slupsk 454 740 178 
Czestochowa 494 692 275 
Note: Land prices in the remaining 29 voivodships not shown above fall within the range ECU 387 to l 182/ha. 
Source: Ostrowski (1995). 
Table 32 
APA land prices, 1994 
Region 
Average (all Poland) 
Central-west 
Central 
Warsaw 
Central-east 
South-east 
South 
South-west 
North 
North-east 
Source: Ostrowski (1995). 
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ECU/ha 
509 
468 
461 
892 
234 
450 
851 
439 
575 
271 
% difference 
to farmer market 
- 28 
- 37 
- 39 
+ 12 
- 62 
- 59 
+2 
+4 
+ 25 
- 57 
3.6.3. The market for rented land 1 
3.6.3.1. Farmers' market 
The private (farmers') market for rented land has remained 
relatively stable in the period 1990-94. Within the market there 
are three main types of rent: the payment of land tax as rent; the 
payment of cash rent and the payment of rent in kind. About 
I 0% of the private rental market comprises the payment of the 
land tax only as rent, and a further 20% is accounted for by 
rents which are equal to the payment of land tax (ECU 3 to 
4/ha) plus an annual cash rent of Zl 100/ha or ECU 37/ha. The 
remaining 70% of the market comprises the payment of rent in 
1 Based on Ostrowski (1995). 
kind in which rent is paid in terms of the crop/product derived 
from the use of the land. Current (1994) examples include: 
(i) 0.1 to 0.5 tonnes of rye (equivalent to ECU 7.4 to 37/ha); 
(ii) 0.2 to 0.35 tonnes of wheat (equivalent to ECU 18.6 to 
33/ha); 
(iii) 1 to 1.5 tonnes of potatoes (equivalent to ECU 74 to 
111/ha); 
(iv) half a pig (value ECU 93). 
3.6.3.2. APA market 
The rent for APA land in 1994 was set at the zloty equivalent 
of 0.2 and 0.5 tonnes of wheat (which was between ECU 18.6 
and 46.5/ha). However, in some cases rents were lower if, for 
example, the lessee took on State-farms debts, agreed to protect 
jobs, or to buy the farm at a later date. The average period for 
rental agreements with the APA is seven years, with the main 
lessees being private farms seeking to increase the size of their 
holdings. 
3.6.4. Regulations and institutional factors affecting the 
land market 
Whilst Polish institutions and private individuals are free to 
trade and to exchange land, foreigners can only buy agricultural 
land if they obtain permission from the Ministry of Agriculture 
(which does not always allow foreign investment/purchase of 
land). In 1994, it is estimated (source: GUS) that there were 
about 20 OOO ha owned by foreigners and a further 44 OOO ha 
with mixed Polish-foreign ownership. 
In relation to the registration of land ownership and title, all 
Polish records are held by courts. Due primarily to a lack of 
adequately trained staff in courts, it is widely considered that it 
takes between six and eight months to complete legal 
registration relating to changes in ownership. 
Overall, trade in the Polish land market has increased 
significantly in recent years (a 35% increase in the area traded 
between 1993 and 1994), although it is still equivalent to only 7 
to 8% of the total agricultural area. This suggests that despite 
the current relatively immature state of the market, the market 
is likely to grow in the next few years. Currently, the primary 
constraint to the development of the market is a lack of capital 
or access to borrowing with which land can be purchased. 
Farming interests lay most of this blame on government policy, 
limited access to credit and low interest rates for borrowing and 
the reluctance of banks to lend to a sector in which returns are 
perceived to be low. 
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Against this background renting has been, and is expected to 
be, the primary way in which land is traded in the next few 
years. 
3. 7. The market for and the use of labour 
The main features relating to the use of labour in Polish 
agriculture are (Table 33) the following. 
(i) Agriculture accounts for about one quarter of total 
employment in Poland. 
(ii) There has been a 15% decrease in the numbers working in 
Polish agriculture. However, over the same period, the 
average number of people working on farms increased 
from 4.27 to 5.0 per hectare (over the same period the 
total agricultural area has remained relatively stable). 
(iii) Although all types of farm ownership experienced 
decreases in the numbers of people working on farms, the 
average number of workers per hectare increased for all 
forms of ownership. Nevertheless, the increase in the 
average number per hectare was lowest among private 
farms and greatest among the remaining State farms and 
collectives. This is mainly attributable to the greater focus 
on social welfare objectives such as employment retention 
in the State sector when compared with private family 
farms. On family farms, use of hired labour tends to be 
minimized, although there are no published data that 
break down use of hired labour in agriculture. 
(iv) In addition to the 3.72 million agricultural labour force in 
1994, it is estimated (GUS) that about a further 1 million 
people are part-time farmers and 0.4 million own 
agricultural land but earn all of their income from non-
agricultural occupations. Compared with 1989, the 
number of part-time farmers and those earning all of their 
income from non-agricultural activities have each fallen 
by 200 OOO. 
The changes in the use of labour in Polish agriculture have 
been made against a background of relatively high levels of 
general unemployment in the economy (an increase in the 
unemployment rate from 6.3% in 1990 to 16% in 1994) which 
has hindered the movement of labour out of agriculture. Whilst 
the level of unemployment is estimated to be lower in rural 
areas (14.2%) than in urban areas (17.4%: source: Sikorska, 
1995), there is estimated to be an element of surplus labour 
remaining in agriculture (Szemberg, 1993) as hidden 
unemployment. This hidden unemployment rate has increased 
from 6 to 21 % of the total agricultural workforce between 1988 
and 1992 and is perceived to be greatest in the areas where 
State farms are concentrated. 
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Table 33 
Key features relating to labour use in Polish agriculture, 1989-94 
Agricultural labour force 
including owners 
Average No of labour units/ha 
State farms 
Collectives 
Family farms 
Other (e.g. owned by churches, companies) 
Total 
Note: Labour units= full-time equivalents. 
Source: GUS. 
Table 34 
Polish agricultural wages, 1990-94 
Average wage per month (ECU) 
Average wage per month (new Zl) 
Average wage in real terms (new Zl) 
Source: GUS. 
Table 35 
1989 
441 OOO 
151 OOO 
3 432 OOO 
371 OOO 
4 395 OOO 
1990 
82.3 
99.16 
99.16 
Average monthly disposable income per capita in 1994 
Household type 
Average (all Poland) 
1994 
143 OOO 
62 OOO 
3 200 OOO 
317 OOO 
3 722 OOO 
1991 
128.7 
168.34 
98.4 
1992 
115.4 
203.98 
95.5 
ECU 
87.4 
1989 
7.95 
5.05 
3.93 
2.84 
4.27 
1993 
125.8 
266.9 
107.58 
ZI 
235 
1994 
12.4 
9.7 
4.3 
7.9 
5.0 
1994 
131.8 
354.4 
127.12 
Employees of companies including State owner, excluding agriculture 
Farmers/agricultural workers 
89.2 
76.2 
240 
205 
Businessmen (private companies) 
Pensioners 
Note: Refers to disposable income after tax per capita in each type of household. 
Source: GUS. 
During the period 1990-94 nominal agricultural wages (in 
zloty) increased by 257% (Table 34) although in real terms, 
the increase was 28%. Prior to the introduction of economic 
reforms in 1989/90, agricultural wages tended to be higher 
than the average for the whole economy. However, by 1994, 
agricultural wages had fallen to a level 15% below the 
average for the rest of the economy. Despite the declining 
relative position for those working in the agricultural sector 
44 
111.5 300 
91.1 245 
between 1990 and 1994, the high levels of general 
unemployment in the economy have contributed to 
constraining the movement of people out of agriculture into 
other sectors. In the context of wage (and income) disparity 
between agriculture and other sectors, it is, however, 
important to recognize that the majority of private farmers in 
Poland rely on some non-agricultural sources of income (see 
subsection 3.8). 
3.8. Agricultural income 
From a position in the late 1980s in which real agricultural 
income was generally higher than income levels in other 
sectors, the relative position has been reversed since 1991 
(Table 36). Also, although real agricultural income stabilized in 
the three years up to 1994, it is still at a considerably lower 
level than five years previously. This highlights the 
deteriorating position of agriculture relative to other sectors of 
the economy and has contributed to the shedding of labour 
from the sector. It should, however, be recognized that many in 
Polish agriculture derive additional income from non-
agricultural sources and only about 20% of private farms derive 
all their income exclusively from farming. Also, 11 % of private 
farms are estimated to have started up new non-agricultural 
businesses between 1988 and 1992 (source: Sikorska, 1993). 
Kurek (1995) estimated that about 68% of farm income comes 
from agricultural activities and the remaining 32% is derived 
Table 36 
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from other sources. Employment outside agriculture also 
contributed 11.8% to household income. The highest share 
( 45 % ) of non-agricultural income in total income of farming 
households is in south-east and central regions of Poland where 
private farming dominates and holdings are small; the lowest 
share is in the western region where current and former large 
State farms predominate (23% ). 
By size of farm, analysis by Brzezik et al. (1992) indicates that 
farm income per hectare tends to be highest for small holdings 
(under 3 ha) and lowest for holdings over 15 ha. However, the 
total level of income derived from smallholdings is rarely 
sufficient to provide adequately for the needs of farm 
households, hence the need to find alternative non-agricultural 
sources of income. This also illustrates the negative correlation 
between farm size and non-agricultural income where the 
smallest farms (under 3 ha) depend heavily on non-agricultural 
income. 
Indices of real income changes on private farms, agricultural income and non-agricultural income, 1985-94 (1985=100) 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Source: GUS 1995; Kwiecinski 1995. 
Table 37 
Private farms 
100 
99.9 
88.5 
121.9 
113.6 
48.6 
73.9 
101.6 
Average net farm income per hectare, 1989-91 
Description 1989 
ECU 
Total (ha) 0.11 
Farm size 1-3 0.14 
Farm size 3-7 0.12 
Farm size 7-10 0.12 
Farm size 10-15 0.1 
Farm size> 15 0.1 
Note: The latest available data are for 1991. 
Source: Brzezik et al. (1992) 
Zl 
0.13 
0.17 
0.15 
0.14 
0.12 
0.12 
Agricultural 
income (general) 
100 
98 
87 
110 
125 
61 
51 
59 
65 
64 
ECU 
0.4 
0.7 
0.52 
0.41 
0.39 
0.35 
1990 
Zl 
0.52 
0.91 
0.68 
0.54 
0.51 
0.45 
Non-agricultural 
income 
100 
83.0 
70.7 
86.7 
109.1 
58.5 
66.8 
72.9 
88.0 
82.2 
ECU 
0.41 
0.96 
0.63 
0.46 
0.4 
0.29 
1991 
Zl 
0.72 
1.70 
1.11 
0.81 
0.70 
0.52 
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Table 38 
Rural-urban population movement, 1981-93 
Description 
Urban areas: inflow 
outflow 
balance 
Rural areas: inflow 
outflow 
balance 
Source: GUS (1995a). 
3.9. Labour migration 
1981-90 
4 196.5 
2 852.5 
+ 1 344.0 
2513.9 
3 857.9 
- 1 344.0 
1990 
346.0 
233.3 
+ 112.7 
183.9 
296.6 
- 112.7 
In the 1980s, there was a general outflow of population from 
rural areas to urban areas (Table 38). This was caused mainly 
by government policies encouraging industrialization and the 
attraction of new urban jobs which were often perceived to be 
less harsh than working in agriculture. However, since 1990, 
the net outflow of population from rural areas has decreased by 
half (from 112 OOO in 1990, to 60 OOO in 1993). This has been 
due to two main factors: poor and worsening job prospects in 
urban areas where unemployment rates have been higher than 
in rural areas and rising costs (higher than rural areas) of living. 
As indicated in subsection 3.8 above, during the difficulties of 
economic transition, it has been relatively easier for farms to 
retain labour (to the extent that there is significant 
underemployment) than in urban areas, with those remaining in 
agriculture generally more willing to accept lower than average 
wages and income than unemployment. 
4. The future direction of the land and labour 
markets in the Czech Republic and Poland 
and the potential direction of impact of CAP 
style direct payments 
This section provides an overview of the potential direction of 
impact of introducing direct payments on cropping patterns, 
and an assessment of the likely future direction of ownership 
patterns, the land and labour markets and household income. 
4.1. Relevant issues to explore 
In examining the potential impact of introducing direct support 
payments into the agricultural sectors of CEECs, there are 
many issues worth examination and analysis. Some of the most 
important issues to examine and which could all justify 
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(I OOO) 
1991 1992 1993 
331.2 314.1 281.1 
224.8 228.4 221.2 
+ 106.4 + 85.7 + 59.9 
174.2 180.0 175.7 
280.6 265.7 235.6 
- 106.4 -85.7 -59.9 
considerable in-depth research in their own right include the 
following. 
(i) What will be the state of the CAP at the time of accession 
for any individual CEEC? Currently the CAP has 
undergone (some) reforms principally in the arable and 
beef sectors, with other sectors such as fruit and 
vegetables, wine and rice awaiting reforms. Also, it is 
expected that the regimes that affect arable crops (mainly 
cereals and oilseeds) may be subject to further reform in 
the next five years. 
(ii) What impact will other support mechanisms to direct 
payments potentially have on the agricultural sectors of 
the CEECs? For example, what will be the nature and 
extent of price support at the time of accession? To what 
extent will domestic production be protected from third 
country competition? 
(iii) What will be the state of national government agricultural 
support in each of the CEECs at the time of accession? 
The future evolution of agricultural policy in each country 
will play a crucial role in influencing cropping patterns, 
structural change and farm income levels. 
(iv) How will GAIT commitments facing both the EU and the 
CEECs affect the development of the CAP and national 
CEECs' agricultural policy? 
(v) What date might CEECs be ready for accession? This will 
vary between countries and will be heavily influenced by 
non-agricultural issues such as macroeconomic policy, the 
state of the economies and the degree of privatization. 
(vi) How have farmers in EU countries reacted to the 
introduction of direct payment support mechanisms and 
how has this impacted on cropping patterns, the land 
market, use of labour and farm income? In many cases, 
comparisons with EU countries as a potential guide to 
impact in the CEECs are not possible because of a lack of 
current analyses of the recent nature of the changes. 
(vii) In the EU, the direct payments were introduced as 
compensation for cuts in price support. If introduced in 
the CEECs they would represent additional levels of 
support rather than compensation. The potential direction 
of impact in EU countries as compared with CEECs may 
therefore differ. 
Against this background, the analysis in this section is limited. 
It focuses on potential issues and problems that may require 
more detailed examination and only examines the potential 
direction of change. It has also been made under the following 
assumptions (all of which were stipulated by DG II): 
(i) the direct payment levels used are those prevailing in the 
EU in the year 1995/96; 
(ii) all other aspects of the CAP regimes are 'as now' (i.e. 
price support levels, intervention rules are those applying 
in 1995/96); 
(iii) agricultural policies in the CEECs are those prevailing in 
1995; 
(iv) projections for crop and livestock production, in the 
absence of considering the imposition of direct payments, 
are those presented in the DG VI agricultural situation 
and prospects in the Central and East European countries 
reports for the Czech Republic and Poland. 
In the two subsections below, the future direction of potential 
change is discussed in the two case study countries. 
Table 39 
Future cropping patterns in the Czech Republic 
Arable area 
Cereals 
Oilseeds 
Fodder crops 
Sugar beet 
Potatoes 
Pulses 
Other crops 
Source: DG VI, European Commission, 1995. 
1994 
3 158 
1 750 
249 
903 
91 
82 
71 
12 
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4.2. Czech Republic 
4.2.1. Future cropping patterns 
A summary of the projected cropping patterns in the Czech 
Republic for 2000 is shown in Table 39. 
These projections are based on a continuation of current Czech 
agricultural policy which neither moves Czech agricultural 
support levels towards EU levels nor reduces the current level 
of intervention. They suggest that as far as land use is 
concerned, productivity measures (higher yields) and reduced 
demand for some products (e.g. sugar and potatoes) will reduce 
the need for arable land (this is likely to be partly afforested 
and partly converted to grassland). Within the arable crop 
sector, there is likely to be a stabilization of cereals and oilseed 
areas, an increase in fodder and pulse crop areas and a 
reduction in sugar and potato areas. 
If a direct payment system were to be introduced into Czech 
agriculture at the current levels applicable in the EU, this would 
add considerably (an increase in gross returns of over 60%) to 
the returns per hectare of all eligible arable land in the country 
(Table 40). This would probably greatly reinforce the current 
and expected trend in cropping patterns away from potatoes 
and sugar (which are not part of the arable area payments 
scheme) to oilseeds, pulses and cereals. In particular, it would 
be reasonable to expect that, at the farm level the financial 
incentive to grow cereals, especially wheat, would increase 
substantially. However, the extent of any shift in cropping 
pattern, will depend on: 
2000 
3 128 
1 750 
250 
890 
71 
69 
80 
18 
I 000/ra 
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(i) many other factors that will impinge on the crop decision-
making process at the farm level (e.g. the level of price 
support and policy on intervention); 
(ii) uncertainties as to how any form of budgetary limits on 
the use and availability of area payments might be applied 
at the national level. If direct payments were limited to a 
national level area quota, the considerable incentives at 
the farm level to shift away from sugar beet and potatoes 
might be diluted by the extent to which the national area 
quota was overshot. Hence, in the first year of any area 
payment scheme operating, Czech farmers would 
probably make significant shifts in cropping to cereals and 
oilseeds, only to find that the incentives were reduced in 
the following year by the extent to which the national area 
quota was exceeded. 
Within any national area quota, it is, however, likely that due to 
the higher yields of cereals relative to oilseeds and pulses, the 
incentives would be greatest for farmers to shift out of pulses 
and oilseeds into cereals and, in particular, to wheat. 
Also increased cereal hectarage and production would increase 
the exportable grain surplus from the Czech Republic. Bearing 
in mind the fact that the GATT limit for subsidized grain 
Table 40 
Potential impact of direct area payments on Czech agriculture 
Arable area (1 OOO ha) 
less potato and sugar beet area (1 OOO ha) 
Small farms area' (1 OOO ha) 
Set-aside area2 (1 OOO ha) 
Area in AAPS (including small farms) (1 OOO ha) 
Average cereal yield3 (tonne/ha) 
Small farmer and AAPS direct payments (ECU/tonne) 
Small farmers direct payment and AAPS (ECU/ha) 
Set-aside payments (ECU/ha) 
Average revenue received from area payments (ECU/ha) 
• if all farms in small farms scheme 
• inAAPS 
Revenue from crop (cereals) sales4 (ECU/ha) 
Total revenue (ECU/ha) 
• in small farms scheme 
• in AAPS 
% increase in revenue as a result of area payments 
• small farmer 
• AAPS farmer 
exports (about 65 OOO tonnes) is already significantly lower 
than the current and projected exportable surplus (0.4 to 0.5 
million tonnes), any additional grain production would have to 
be sold at world market prices. 
4.2.2. Ownership 
The current ownership pattern, in which cooperatives account 
for nearly 50% of the area farmed in the Czech Republic, is 
under current agricultural policy conditions expected to be 
maintained over the next five years. Of the remaining 0.75 
million ha of State farmland awaiting privatization, this process 
is expected to be completed by 2000, and to be divided 
between family farms/partnerships and/or cooperatives. 
However, there is likely to be an increase in the area farmed by 
partnerships and farming companies, at the expense of family 
farms and cooperatives (i.e. a continuation of recent ownership 
trends). Overall, the ownership structure in the Czech Republic 
will become less polarized. 
Should an area-based support scheme be introduced, the 
substantial increase in revenue and potential profitability 
referred to in the subsection above and Table 40 is likely to: 
1994 
3 158 
2 948 
295 
265.3 
2 387.9 
4.12 
54.34 
223.88 
283.58 
223.88 
229.84 
362.56 
586.44 
592.36 
61.7 
63.49 
2000 
3 128 
2 988 
299 
268.9 
2 420.3 
4.49 
54.34 
244.0 
309.05 
243.98 
250.50 
395.12 
639.10 
645.62 
61.7 
63.4 
1 Small farm area: based on 10% of the Czech arable area being in holdings under 10 ha (estimate). 
2 Set-aside assumed rate of 10%. 
3 Cereal yields chosen as they are higher than oilseed and pulse yields. 
4 Cereal revenues based on ECU 88/tonne. 
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(i) reinforce/accelerate the ownership trend towards private 
partnerships and limited companies (increased returns to 
the sector will attract outside investors into the sector); 
(ii) encourage some landowners who have currently chosen to 
remain within cooperatives (primarily because of the 
security offered by co-ops during difficult and changing 
economic times) to withdraw and farm as private 
individuals/partnerships (security being now provided by 
area payments and prospects for earning a reasonable 
income being considerably enhanced). 
4.2.3. Structure of holdings 
Whilst the main feature of the current structure of holdings in 
the Czech Republic is a relatively high average holding size 
(67 ha), with the majority of the agricultural area (68%) found 
in holdings over 1 OOO ha in size, there has, since 1990 been an 
increase in the total number of holdings and a decline in the 
average size of holdings. The primary reason for this process 
has been the privatization of former State farms and collectives 
and the withdrawal of private landowners from cooperatives. 
Under current policy conditions, it is expected that this process 
will continue, especially as there are about a further 0.75 
million ha of State farmland timetabled for privatization over 
the next few years. 
Bearing in mind the potential impact on ownership of 
introducing an area-based support mechanism, the impact on 
the structure of holdings may cause two effects that pull in 
different directions. On the one hand, the increased profitability 
of the sector that may accelerate ownership trends in favour of 
partnerships and limited companies may lead to a consolidation 
of holdings and increasing average holding size. On the other 
hand, current co-op members leaving cooperatives to farm 
alone will have the opposite effect and reduce the average 
holding size. 
4.2.4. The land market 
Currently the private Czech land market is virtually non-
existent, with land prices and rents primarily determined by the 
government administrative price system. Over the next five 
years, it is expected that a private market will slowly develop, 
with land prices and rents increasing. This will be mainly 
associated with predicted improvements in the performance of 
the sector and may lead to a doubling/tripling of land 
prices/rents. In the long term, it is to be expected that changes 
in land prices and rents will produce returns that are broadly 
comparable to interest rates in the Czech Republic. Attempting 
to draw on comparable EU data as a potential indicator of 
impact has, however, been of little assistance. The author is 
unaware of any current published work that has examined the 
impact of the Arable Area Payments Scheme (AAPS) on EU 
Annex 
land prices. Also, both rents and land prices vary widely 
between, and within, EU countries. The injection of additional 
revenue into the sector that would occur if an AAPS was 
introduced into the Czech Republic would probably result in an 
increase in the demand for arable land which would inevitably 
push up land prices and rents. Assuming that long-term land 
prices tend to reflect returns akin to real interest rates (currently 
in the Czech Republic real interest rates are between 3 and 5% 
depending on whether short or long-term rates are taken), the 
impact of introducing an AAPS on farmer revenues would 
potentially result in land prices increasing substantially. For 
example, assuming that all of the AAPS payments were 
additional revenue (i.e. no additional costs) the average Czech 
land price might be expected to increase nearly fivefold 
(assuming a real interest rate of 3%; if the real interest rate was 
5%, the increase in land price would be by a factor of about 
2.5). Factors that will influence the level of impact include: 
(i) the timing of the introduction of such a support scheme. 
Over the next five years, other factors (see subsection 2.6) 
are likely to play a far more important influence on the 
market for land, primarily because there is no current real 
land market in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, if a date 
was set for accession to the EU (including clarification of 
conditions for adopting the CAP) in the next few years, 
anticipation of future increases in revenue associated with 
adopting an AAPS would push up land prices further; 
(ii) the extent to which current non-farming landowners, 
many of whom are urban dwellers (2.1 million), might 
decide to take up farming as an occupation. The 60% plus 
increase in returns referred to associated with the 
introduction of an AAPS in the Czech Republic might 
tempt some urban dwellers to take up agriculture. The 
extent to which this might occur would then reduce the 
area for rent but increase the use by owners of land and 
their demand for additional land; 
(iii) who would receive the area payments? In the EU, it is the 
farmer, regardless of whether he/she is the landowner or a 
tenant, who receives the area payments. In the Czech 
Republic where nearly half of the current agricultural area 
is farmed by cooperatives, it is unclear as to who, in the 
case of cooperatives, might be eligible to apply for area 
payments and hence, to receive such payments. If the 
payments were made to cooperatives, the benefits would 
probably be distributed to members as increased 
allocations of surpluses/profits, although some of the 
benefits might be dissipated via higher wages to workers. 
If, however, the right to receive payments was granted to 
the actual landowners, it might encourage some owners 
to: 
• withdraw from co-ops to farm alone (this would only 
impact on the land market if it also resulted in the 
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individual farmers seeking to rent/acquire additional 
land); 
• withdraw from the co-op to rent their land to the highest 
bidder. 
4.2.5. Farm income, wages and use of labour 
The current position in the Czech Republic relating to farm 
income, wage levels and use of labour in agriculture is one in 
which: 
(i) many elements, especially the remaining State farms, are 
unprofitable; 
(ii) real agricultural income and wages have fallen relative to 
other sectors of the economy; 
(iii) there has been a halving in the agricultural workforce 
since 1989; 
(iv) income from non-agricultural activities has become 
increasingly important (this accounts for 29% of total 
agricultural household income); 
(v) there is significant (unquantified) underemployment of the 
remaining agricultural workforce. 
Over the next five years, the overall profitability position of the 
sector is expected to improve, especially as the remaining State 
farms (which account for about half of the total losses in the 
sector) are privatized. Real incomes and wages have already 
improved in the last year and it is expected that this trend will 
continue, although the disparity between the agricultural and 
non-agricultural sector is not expected to be removed (i.e. 
average agricultural income and wages are likely to remain 
lower than the average levels for the economy as a whole). In 
the market for labour, the reduction in the numbers working in 
the sector is expected to continue, although at a significantly 
slower rate than during the shake out during the early 1990s 
(most of the State sector has already been privatized and there 
is currently only a workforce of 5 300 on the remaining 229 
State farms). 
If an EU-style area payments mechanism was introduced to the 
Czech Republic, the direction of impact is likely to be as 
follows. 
(i) Income: a substantial improvement in the level of 
agricultural income. 
(ii) Wages: an increase in the level of real agricultural wages, 
possibly removing the disparity between agricultural and 
non-agricultural wages. This is likely to occur because the 
increased returns in the sector will attract resources into 
50 
the sector and increase the demand for factors of 
production such as labour. 
(iii) Employment: the direction of impact might be both an 
increase or a decrease in demand for labour. If increased 
interest in agricultural production results in increased 
demand for factors of production, including labour, this 
will contribute to a slowing down in the rate of labour 
migration out of the sector. However, the extent to which 
additional labour resources might be required in the sector 
will be influenced by the current level of 
underemployment in the sector and this source of 
additional labour resource might meet most, all, or some 
of any increased demand for labour. Another factor that 
may influence employment levels is that some farms 
might utilize their extra revenue for capital and equipment 
purchase (labour replacement) and hence accelerate the 
labour exodus from the sector. Also, if there is a shift in 
cropping patterns away from potatoes to cereals, there is 
likely to be a decrease in demand for labour (potatoes 
being traditionally a more labour-intensive crop than 
cereals). 
4.3. Poland 
4.3.1. Future cropping patterns in Poland 
The projected direction of Polish cropping patterns is similar to 
those in the Czech Republic (Table 41) with the exception that 
the total arable area is not expected to change significantly. 
Within the arable crop sector, the areas of cereals and oilseeds 
are expected to increase whilst the areas of sugar beet and 
potatoes are expected to decrease. 
If a direct payment system were to be introduced into Polish 
agriculture, similar impacts to those discussed in subsection 4.2 
for the Czech Republic would be likely to occur. There would 
probably be a substantial increase in gross returns/ha (Table 42) 
which would reinforce the current and expected trend in 
cropping patterns away from potatoes and sugar to oilseeds, 
pulses and cereals. It is also likely that a considerable 
proportion of the current 1.1 million ha of idle land would be 
brought back into the production of cereals and oilseeds. The 
extent of any shift in cropping pattern, will however be 
influenced by: 
(i) many other factors that will impinge on the crop decision-
making process at the farm level (e.g. the level of price 
support and policy on intervention); 
(ii) uncertainties as to how any form of budgetary limits on 
the use and availability of area payments might be applied 
at the national level (see subsection 4.2 for further 
Table 41 
Future cropping patterns in Poland 
Arable area 
Cereals 
Oilseeds 
Sugar beet 
Potatoes 
Pulses 
Other crops 
1994 
14 300 
8 481 
370 
401 
1 697 
394 
2 957 
2000 
14 300 
8 600 
550 
315 
1 550 
3 285 
Annex 
I 000/w 
Note: Other crops includes: 1.1 million ha which were fallow in 1994, pulses and fodder crops. 
Source: DG VI, European Commission 1995. 
discussion on this impact, which is likely on be similar in 
the Czech Republic and Poland). 
Overall, the impact in Poland is likely to be greater than in the 
Czech Republic mainly because of the larger arable area ( 4 to 5 
times the area in the Czech Republic) and the current 1.1 
million ha of idle agricultural land in Poland that would 
probably be brought back into production. 
4.3.2. Ownership 
The current ownership pattern in Poland differs substantially 
from the pattern in the Czech Republic. Private family farms 
dominate Polish agriculture and are expected to continue to do 
so over the next five years. Nevertheless, the area farmed by 
other forms of private businesses (partnerships and companies) 
is expected to increase. Of the remaining 2.4 million ha of State 
farmland awaiting privatization, this is expected to be 
completed over the next 5 to 10 years with the majority of this 
land being used by private farms and partnerships by 2000. 
If an AAPS was introduced into Poland, a substantial increase 
in revenue would be likely to produce similar results as in the 
Czech Republic (i.e. accelerate the ownership trend towards 
private partnerships and limited companies). However, because 
of the dominance of private farms in Poland, the development 
of partnership and limited company interest in agriculture is 
unlikely to develop to the same degree as in the Czech 
Republic. 
4.3.3. Structure of holdings 
The current structure of holdings in Poland is in marked 
contrast to the Czech Republic. The average size of holding is 
considerably smaller in Poland (9.6 ha) with the majority of the 
agricultural area found in holdings under 10 ha in size. 
Nevertheless, since 1990, there has been an increase in the 
average size of holdings and the total area of farms in size 
groups over 20 ha. The primary reason for this has been the 
privatization of former State farms and collectives, which have 
provided many private farmers with additional land and the 
development of a land market in which nearly 1 million ha 
have been sold/rented out and allowed many farmers to 
increase the size of their holdings and the withdrawal of private 
landowners from cooperatives. 
Under current policy conditions, it is expected that this trend 
will continue and the share of bigger farms (over 20 ha) is 
expected to account for 30% of total agricultural area by 2000 
(they accounted for 20% of the area in 1994). 
It is however, difficult to predict what impact the introduction 
of an AAPS might have on the structure of Polish holdings. On 
one hand, it might accelerate the consolidation process to 
higher average farm size, as existing private farmers seek 
additional land, or it might encourage some non-farming 
landowners who currently rent out their land, to take up 
farming. If this occurs, it may slow down the consolidation 
process. Since the number of non-farming owners of 
agricultural land is very small when compared with the Czech 
Republic this potential direction of change is unlikely to be as 
significant in Poland in comparison with the Czech Republic. 
4.3.4. The land market 
The private land market in Poland is currently not well 
developed (equivalent of7 to 8% of the total agricultural land 
being traded in 1994). Over the next five years it is expected 
that the market will continue to develop, with land prices and 
rents increasing. Assuming that all of the AAPS payments were 
additional revenue to Polish farmers, the average Polish land 
price might be expected to increase by a factor of between 5 
and 12 assuming a real interest rate of between 2 and 4% 
(current real interest rates in Poland are 2 to 4% depending on 
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Table 42 
Potential impact of direct area payments on Polish agriculture 
Arable area (I OOO ha) 
less potato and sugar beet area (I OOO ha) 
Small farms area 1 ( 1 OOO ha) 
Set-aside area2 ( 1 OOO ha) 
Area in AAPS (excluding small farms) (I OOO ha) 
Average cereal yield3 (tonne/ha) 
Small farmer and AAPS direct payments (ECU/tonne) 
Small farmers direct payment and AAPS (ECU/ha) 
Set-aside payments (ECU/ha) 
Average farm size (ha) 
Average revenue received from area payments (ECU/ha) 
• if all farms in small farms scheme 
• inAAPS 
Revenue from crop (cereals) sales4 (ECU/ha) 
Total revenue (ECU/ha) 
• in small farms scheme 
• in AAPS 
% increase in revenue as a result of area payments 
• small farmer 
~ AAPS farmer 
1 Small farm area: based on 80% of holdings under 20 ha. 
Set-aside assumed rate of 10%. 
' Cereal yields chosen as they are higher than oilseed and pulse yields. 
' Cereal price based on ECU 98/tonne (1994 average Polish price). 
whether short or long-term rates are chosen). Whilst potential 
relative impact of AAPS payments on Polish land prices is 
higher than in the Czech Republic, this mainly reflects the 
current low level of Polish land prices compared with Czech 
prices. Even if these rates of increase were to occur in Poland, 
Polish land prices are unlikely to rise to levels in the Czech 
Republic. This probably reflects the large area of agricultural 
land in Poland which provides for an abundant supply of 
agricultural land. As in the Czech Republic, this will be mainly 
associated with improvements in the performance of the sector. 
Over the period 1990-94, average land prices rose by 220% in 
real terms and it is likely that over the next two to three years 
real prices will rise by two to three times. 
The potential impact of introducing AAPS on the Polish land 
market is likely to increase the demand for arable land which 
will push up land prices and rents further. By how much land 
prices and rent might increase is, however, difficult to forecast 
(the analysis in the previous paragraph gives some pointers). 
Factors that will influence the level of impact include: 
(i) the timing of the introduction of such a support scheme. 
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Over the next five years, other factors (see subsection 3.6) 
are likely to have a far more important influence on the 
1994 
14 300 
12 202 
9 760 
245 
2 197 
2.57 
54.34 
139.64 
176.89 
6.7 
139.64 
139.64 
143.36 
251.86 
391.50 
395.22 
55.4 
56.9 
2000 
14 300 
12 435 
8 705 
373 
3 357 
3.28 
54.34 
178.22 
225.76 
7.5 
178.22 
178.22 
182.97 
321.44 
499.66 
504.41 
55.4 
56.9 
market for land, primarily because the Polish land market 
is not well developed. Nevertheless, if a date for Polish 
accession to the EU was set in the next few years, 
anticipation of adopting an AAPS would probably push 
up Polish land prices further; 
(ii) the extent to which current non-farming landowners, some 
of whom are urban dwellers, might decide to take up 
farming as an occupation. Since, however, current urban 
dwellers own less than 1 % of the Polish agricultural area, 
this factor is unlikely to have a significant impact. 
4.3.5. Fann income, wages and use of labour 
The main features relating to farm income, wage levels and use 
of labour in Polish agriculture are: 
(i) many units, especially the remaining State farms, are 
unprofitable; 
(ii) real agricultural income and wages have fallen relative to 
other sectors of the economy; 
(iii) there has been a 15% decrease in the agricultural 
workforce since 1989; 
(iv) income from non-agricultural activities is an important 
part of Polish agricultural household income - its 
relative importance has also increased in the last five 
years; 
(v) there is significant underemployment of the remaining 
agricultural workforce estimated to be equal to about 21 % 
of the agricultural workforce. 
Over the next five years, the overall profitability position of the 
sector is expected to improve. Real incomes and wages have 
already improved in the last year and it is expected that this 
trend will continue although, as in the Czech Republic, the 
disparity between the agricultural and non-agricultural sector is 
not expected to be removed. 
In the market for labour, the reduction in the numbers working 
in the sector is expected to continue, although against a 
continuing background of higher levels of unemployment in the 
Polish economy, the scope for those in agriculture to leave the 
sector for alternative employment will remain limited. 
Consequently, it is expected that there will still be over 3 
million working in agriculture in 2000, many of whom are 
underemployed and/or working part time. 
If an AAPS was introduced into Polish agriculture the likely 
direction of impact will be similar to the impact referred to in 
the Czech Republic (subsection 4.2), namely the following. 
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(i) Income: a substantial improvement in the level of 
agricultural income. 
(ii) Wages: an increase in the level of real agricultural wages, 
possibly removing the disparity between agricultural and 
non-agricultural wages (because the area payments will 
give the agricultural sector an income injection not 
provided to other sectors). Nevertheless, as Polish 
agriculture has not experienced the same degree of labour 
shake out as the Czech Republic, any upward pressure on 
wages is likely to be less than in the Czech Republic. 
(iii) Employment: the likely increased profitability of the 
sector would pull in two opposite directions. On the one 
hand, the demand for labour might increase (increased 
profitability leading to an increase in demand for all 
factors of production). On the other hand, the increased 
profitability may lead to increased labour replacement by 
capital factors of production and a shift in cropping 
patterns from relatively labour-intensive potato production 
to relatively capital-intensive cereal production. Also, any 
increase in demand for labour might be taken up by the 
current significant levels of underemployed people in the 
sector. When compared with the Czech Republic, the 
positive employment impact of adopting an AAPS is 
likely to be less apparent in Poland (higher levels of 
underemployment and a lower level of reduction in the 
agricultural labour force, 1990-94). 
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Appendix 1 Economic accounts for Czech agriculture, 1993 and 1994 
Economic accounts for Czech agriculture, 1993 and 1994 
(million Kcs) 
1993 1994 
Cereals 
Wheat 9 001.3 9 058.4 
Rye 702.5 723.5 
Barley 5 829.4 5 125.7 
Oats 530.7 375.3 
Maize 480.0 438.3 
Other 151.0 185.8 
Rice 0.0 0.0 
Pulses 623.7 394.9 
Root crops 
Potatoes 5 402.2 3 981.0 
Sugar beet 3 485.4 2 213.0 
Industrial crops 
Oil seeds 2 684.9 3 126.9 
Fibre plants 89.8 101.4 
Tobacco 0.0 0.0 
Hops 1 675.2 1 389.3 
Other 271.1 309.7 
Fresh vegetables 7 028.3 7312.0 
Fruit 2 829.1 2 470.9 
Grapes 468.1 592.9 
Seeds 168.9 62.0 
Final crop output 42 371.1 38 718.8 
Animals 
Cattle (including calves) 7 267.8 8 196.4 
Pigs 17 697.1 20 231.5 
Equines 268.7 270.1 
Sheep and Goats 19.6 49.0 
Poultry 3 534.7 3931.8 
Animal products 
Milk 18 658.9 16 706.4 
Eggs 4 899.4 5 080.3 
Wool 3.8 3.0 
Other 580.5 575.7 
Final animal output 52 930.4 55 044.1 
Final agricultural output 95 301.5 93 762.9 
Total intermediate consumption 65 577.1 62 935.8 
Gross value added at market prices 29 724.4 30 827.1 
Subsidies 1 331.0 2 255.0 
Taxes linked to production excluding VAT 2 270.0 2 270.0 
Gross value added at factor cost 28 785.4 30 812.1 
Depreciation 9 002.1 9 449.0 
Net value added at factor cost 19 783.3 21363.1 
Compensation of employees 22 080.1 21 971.2 
Net operating surplus (2 296.7) (608.1) 
Rent and other payments 1 174.6 1 600.0 
Interest 4 309.4 4 509.4 
Net income from agricultural activity of total labour 14 299.4 15 253.8 
Source: CSO, VUZE. 
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Appendix 2 Production of the main agricultural products in the Czech Republic, 1989-95 
Production of the main agricultural products in the Czech Republic, 1989-95 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Milk in million litres 
Domestic supply 4473 4 380 3 518 3 218 2 906 2 686 2 530 
Domestic demand 3 080 3 082 2 642 2 379 2 008 2 050 2 020 
Export 1 393 1 298 901 892 923 774 580 
Final stocks 53 53 53 108 54 64 
Beef meat in 1 OOO tonnes L W 
Output 519 511 574 420 390 313 289 
Domestic demand 482 467 399 344 347 314 308 
Export 36 45 184 77 56 31 5 
Final stocks 35 30 32 25 11 0 
Pig meat in 1 OOO tonnes L W 
Output 778 772 690 740 710 655 525 
Domestic demand 764 770 676 700 690 675 535 
Export 14 2 20 40 24 7 5 
Final stocks 33 28 29 25 15 20 
Cereals in 1 OOO tonnes 
Output. 7 793 8 947 7 845 6 565 6 600 7 210 7 080 
Domestic demand 7 841 8 231 7 220 7 039 6 417 6 793 6 739 
Export 131 6 420 493 59 526 829 
Final stocks 993 1 716 1 929 1 101 1 765 1 900 1 587.2 
Wheat in 1 OOO tonnes 
Output 4 090 4624 4 081 3 413 3 370 3 898 3 878 
Domestic demand 4 148 4 236 3 414 3 689 3 075 3 256 3 321 
Export 31 4 350 301 28 419.2 700 
Final stocks 516 900 1220 658 1 095 1 338.6 1 215.6 
Crop area in 1 OOO ha 
Cereals 1 661.9 1 639.7 1 611.8 1 583.2 1 630 1 750 1683 
Sugar beet 126.6 118.1 118.8 124.1 106.7 91.1 93.6 
Potatoes 115.3 109.3 113.3 110.5 102.8 76.7 80 
Oil seeds 121.5 129.9 161.6 165.7 192.4 250 312 
Flax 21.2 20.9 15.2 9.3 7.6 10 
Herd size in 1 OOO head 
Cattle 3 480 3 506 3 360 2 950 2 511 2 161 2 031 
of which Cows 1 247 1 236 1 195 1 036 975 830 768 
Pigs 4 685 4 790 4 560 4 609 4 599 4000 3 862 
Poultry 32479 31 981 33 278 30 756 28 219 26 800 26 592 
Crop production in 1 OOO tonnes 
Cereals 7 793.1 8 946.9 7 845.3 6 564.9 6 600 7 210 7 080 
Oil rape 313.3 304.5 348.3 292.9 377.2 451.6 663 
Sugar beet 4 497 4 017.3 4 008.7 3 871.5 4 308.3 3 240 3 463 
Potatoes 2 421.8 1 755.1 2 043.2 1 969.2 2 396 1 342 1424 
Animal production 
Beef meat in 1 OOO tonnes 518.5 511 574 420 390.3 313 289 
Pig meat in 1 OOO tonnes 778 792 690 740 712 655 525 
Poultry meat in 1 OOO tonnes 199 210 208 170 157 165 175 
Milk in million litres 4 900 4 700 4100 3 724 3 443 3 179 3 007 
Eggs in millions 3 643 3 681 3 500 3 673 3400 3 300 3 350 
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Production of the main agricultural products in the Czech Republic, 1989-95 ( continued) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Gross agricultural output 
(million Kcs), 1989 prices 
Gross agricultural output 108.6 106.1 96.7 . 85 83 78.4 
crop production 44.7 44.4 43.1 35.7 37.4 35.2 
animal production 63.9 61.7 53.6 49.3 45.6 43.2 
crop(%) 41.2 41.8 44.6 42.0 45.1 44.9 
animal(%) 58.8 58.2 55.4 58.0 54.9 55.1 
Gross agricultural output(%) 100.0 97.7 89.0 78.3 76.4 72.2 
crop production(%) 100.0 99.3 96.4 79.9 83.7 78.7 
animal production (%) 100.0 96.6 83.9 77.2 71.4 67.6 
Source: CSO, VUZE. 
, .. 
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Appendix 3 Definitions of the different types of 
ownership in Poland 
(a) Private farms. These are classified as privately-owned 
land which for statistical purposes (i.e. collection of 
census and survey data) must be greater than 1 ha. 
(b) Cooperative farms refer to private cooperatives 
comprising individuals who have chosen to operate 
collectively. 
Although cooperative farms have been classified as private in 
Poland, for years (i.e. pre-break-up of the Communist system) 
Annex 
they have been perceived to be somewhere between private and 
State owned and are sometimes called quasi-State farms. This 
stems from cooperative law which was formulated under 
Communism in such a way that it was not clear who actually 
owned the assets of the cooperative. Under post-reform 
changes to cooperative law, cooperatives operate essentially as 
groups of individual landowners choosing to operate 
collectively as a cooperative and sharing the benefits. 
State farms were land which was State property or was used by 
State firm(s). 
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Appendix4 Regional map of Poland 
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